Remote multi-agent workspace CLI with deep Claude integration, native terminal streaming, and self-hosting.
Allowed — no malicious behavior detected
25 low-signal patterns reviewed and cleared.
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The postinstall hook performs local platform-tool extraction and a node-pty permission fix. The package’s relay behavior and the access it gives the server operator are disclosed in its README, and the inspected flagged code did not establish credential theft or concealed payload execution.
Installation runs the declared postinstall hook; CLI and relay activity occurs when users invoke the tool or start its daemon.
Impact
No malicious impact identified. The README discloses that the relay operator can access session contents and account secrets.
Mechanism
Postinstall extracts platform-specific tool archives and repairs node-pty permissions. Runtime service traffic uses the documented relay, with configurable endpoints.
Network endpoints1
veryhappy.dev
Decision evidence
public snapshot
Evidence for AI clean decision
The postinstall script unpacks platform-specific tool archives and fixes node-pty permissions.
The permission fix is for node-pty’s terminal spawn helper.
The README identifies veryhappy.dev as the default service and documents configurable server endpoints.
The README discloses that the relay operator can read session contents and recover account secrets.
The package entry point imports the CLI package and index modules; no attack behavior was identified in the inspected entry-point code.
Evidence against
The inspected install hook performs local tool extraction and a terminal-helper permission fix.
The package describes its remote relay behavior and warns users about the data the server can access.
The flagged child-process use is consistent with launching the CLI and agent sessions; no concealed payload execution was found in the inspected source.
Behavioral surface
SourceChild process · Crypto · Dynamic require · Environment variables · Filesystem · Network · Shell · Web socket
Supply chainHigh entropy strings · Possible obfuscation · URL strings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
Scanned 374 files · 7.30 MB of source
20 external domains referenced
127.0.0.1
accounts.google.com
api.cluster-fluster.com
api.openai.com
auth.openai.com
claude.ai
code.claude.com
console.anthropic.com
developers.google.com
docs.openclaw.ai
github.com
goo.gle
happy.mereith.com
host.example.ts.net
oauth2.googleapis.com
opencode.ai
registry.npmjs.org
veryhappy.dev
www.apple.com
www.googleapis.com
Findings
4 critical · 9 high · 7 medium · 5 low
Automated scan signals; the review checked them and cleared this version. Where they are, most severe file first. Code opens a file's flagged lines, with their evidence, below.
11import { a as issueRelaunchEnv } from'./sessionMetadata-C1eoAi89.mjs';
12import { h as teamExitMarkerPath, e as detectTeamUserLanguage, i as teamOwnerText, a as teamLanguageRule, d as teamLanguageReminder, t as teamRequest } from'./client-ycA0VK2e.mjs'...
13import { f as ensurePrivateDirectorySync, w writePrivateFileSync, c configuration } ;