---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/vinzzknight"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/vinzzknight/v/1.0.3.md"
package: "vinzzknight"
report_status: "published"
title: "vinzzknight@1.0.3 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "1.0.3"
---

# vinzzknight@1.0.3 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — Users’ outgoing messages can carry concealed attribution promoting a channel they did not choose.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Block by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 1.0.3
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The default media-message path adds a hard-coded newsletter attribution whenever callers omit annotations, altering user messages to promote a publisher-chosen channel. This is concrete, concealed account misuse in a WhatsApp library.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 92.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-10T02:45:33.099Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-10T02:46:15.795Z
- **Download time:** 503 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1772 ms
- **AI review time:** 40421 ms
- **Total time:** 42696 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The package silently adds publisher-chosen newsletter attribution to outgoing WhatsApp media messages.

- **Trigger:** A caller prepares media without supplying annotations; the separate event handler adds its own attribution when invoked.

- **Impact:** Users’ outgoing messages can carry concealed attribution promoting a channel they did not choose.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Utils/messages.js, lib/Socket/dugong.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-10T02:46:15.795Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The message builder inserts fixed newsletter metadata, including a hard-coded channel JID and name, into the outgoing message annotations.

- **Attack narrative:** When media is prepared without caller-provided annotations, the library silently inserts a publisher-chosen newsletter JID and name into the outgoing message. This can promote a channel through users’ WhatsApp messages without their request.

- **Rationale:** The default media-message path adds a hard-coded newsletter attribution whenever callers omit annotations, altering user messages to promote a publisher-chosen channel. This is concrete, concealed account misuse in a WhatsApp library.

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 92.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** When media has no caller-supplied annotations, the message builder adds a newsletter annotation naming the hard-coded JID 120363420249672073@newsletter and channel name “kyuu ilysm”. This modifies outgoing messages without the caller requesting that attribution., A separate event-message handler also embeds the hard-coded newsletter JID 120363297591152843@newsletter.

- **Evidence against:** The preinstall hook only checks the Node.js major version and exits on versions below 20; it does not collect data or contact a host., The package presents itself as a WhatsApp API library, where sending messages and media is expected functionality.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to vinzzknight@1.0.3.

- Avoid installing vinzzknight@1.0.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/vinzzknight@1.0.3/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 7. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 8. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/vinzzknight@1.0.3/WAProto/index.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = WAProto/index.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 8472622
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 9. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 10. Medium: Git Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package manifest contains a git dependency.

### 11. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/vinzzknight@1.0.3/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = devilkyuuna@1.0.11
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:ZGV2aWxreXV1bmE:1.0.11
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 12. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/vinzzknight@1.0.3/lib/Utils/messages.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = devilkyuuna@1.0.11
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages.js
matchedIdentity = npm:ZGV2aWxreXV1bmE:1.0.11
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall, prepare
- **Dependencies:** 19
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 20
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 23

### Published dependency entries
- @adiwajshing/keyed-db ^0.2.4 (Dependency)
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (Dependency)
- axios ^1.3.3 (Dependency)
- cache-manager 4.0.1 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- futoin-hkdf ^1.5.1 (Dependency)
- libphonenumber-js ^1.10.20 (Dependency)
- libsignal npm:libsignal-node-vinzz (Dependency)
- lodash ^4.17.21 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^7.12.3 (Dependency)
- node-cache ^5.1.2 (Dependency)
- node-fetch ^2.6.1 (Dependency)
- pino ^7.0.0 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^7.2.4 (Dependency)
- uuid ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- jimp ^0.16.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- qrcode-terminal ^0.12.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp ^0.32.2 (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** vinzzknight
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.0.3
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-02-12T09:21:32.800Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-10T02:46:09.756Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-10T02:46:39.116Z
- **Known versions:** 3
- **Latest version:** 1.0.4
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** WhatsApp API Modification By Vinzz
- **Author:** VinzzOfficial
- **Keywords:** whatsapp, laurine-wabot, baileys, whatsapp-web, whatsapp-chat, whatsapp-group, botwa, stvnnvs
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 197
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 9,844,056 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/vinzzknight/v/1.0.3>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/VinzzOfficial>)
- [Homepage](<https://npmjs.com/vinzzknight>)
- [OpenSSF/OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-19030>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/vinzzknight>)
- [WEB](<https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/>)
