w-docx2pdf@1.0.20
A tool for docx2pdf.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package's postinstall hook remotely fetches a native executable and runtime code executes it without integrity validation. The behavior may support its stated conversion feature, but the remote executable supply chain is unsafe and unresolved.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs an automatic postinstall script.
- The postinstall path downloads a Windows executable from a mutable GitHub branch into the package.
- The downloaded executable is later selected and executed for document conversion without an integrity check.
- The runtime fallback repeats the download if the executable is absent.
- The executable download and invocation are structurally related to the advertised Windows document-conversion feature.
- No source code inspected harvests credentials or uploads local data.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
srcPython/test.batView on unpkgPackage ships compressed or archive-like blobs.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to w-docx2pdf@1.0.20.
See all versions of w-docx2pdf for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of w-docx2pdf@1.0.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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