w-docx2pdf@1.0.24
A tool for docx2pdf.
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected code shows an unverified executable download during postinstall and its later execution during Windows conversion. That creates a concrete, package-aligned supply-chain risk, but the source does not prove an active attack, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook invokes an installer that downloads a Windows executable from a mutable GitHub branch into the package source directory.
- The Windows conversion path obtains that executable and passes it to a child-process helper when conversion is requested.
- The executable is consistent with the package's stated DOCX-to-PDF function, but its contents are fetched remotely and are not verified by the inspected source.
- The installer exits when it is not running under node_modules, and the executable is only invoked from the conversion function.
- The conversion code rejects non-Windows platforms and supports an explicit LibreOffice mode.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
srcPython/test.batView on unpkgPackage ships compressed or archive-like blobs.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to w-docx2pdf@1.0.24.
See all versions of w-docx2pdf for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of w-docx2pdf@1.0.24 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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