w-docx2pdf@1.0.26
⚠ Under reviewA tool for docx2pdf.
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected lifecycle and runtime behavior is consistent with the package’s document conversion function, with no confirmed attack surface established. The required test PDF was unreadable, so manual review is warranted to resolve that evidence gap.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs a postinstall script that downloads cv.exe from the project’s GitHub repository into the package’s src directory.
- The installer skips execution outside node_modules, and the runtime downloads the same executable only when conversion needs it.
- The required test PDF could not be read as printable UTF-8, so its contents remain unverified.
- The inspected installer targets the package’s own src directory; no broad consumer-project mutation or secret handling was established.
- The inspected runtime excerpt selects the Windows conversion executable and uses it in the documented document-conversion flow.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
srcPython/test.batView on unpkgPackage ships compressed or archive-like blobs.
Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to w-docx2pdf@1.0.26.
See all versions of w-docx2pdf for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of w-docx2pdf@1.0.26 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.