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warden-ai@0.5.2: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / warden-ai / 0.5.2

warden-ai@0.5.2

The structurally-verified context layer for AI coding agents. 28 MCP tools across 10 layers: code intelligence (tree-sitter, 30+ languages), context selection, tool output pruning (50-91% per call), agent memory with lifecycle, response compression, file

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. Installing the package executes a hidden initializer that alters AI-agent configuration and rules. It registers Warden across global and project agent control surfaces and enables automatic approval for its Codex MCP tools.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm postinstall

Impact

Warden is persistently activated in multiple agents without an explicit user command; its MCP tools may run with auto approval in Codex.

Mechanism

silent broad AI-agent MCP registration, rule/hook installation, and approval-policy mutation

Policy narrative

On npm install, the postinstall hook suppresses output and invokes `warden init`. That initializer registers the package as an MCP server in agent configurations, writes project and global rules, installs enforcement hooks, and changes Codex's Warden MCP entry to automatic tool approval. These are foreign, broad AI-agent control-surface mutations performed without an explicit setup command.

Rationale

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including automatic tool approval. The absence of exfiltration does not remove the install-time control-hijack behavior.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/postinstall.cjsdist/index.jsdist/cli.js$HOME/.codex/config.toml$HOME/.cursor/mcp.json$HOME/.cursor/permissions.json.mcp.json.cursor/mcp.json

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.cjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.cjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/warden.jsView file

22// Compiled output not present — fall back to tsx for dev convenience. L23: const { spawn } = await import("node:child_process"); L24: const src = resolve(here, "..", "src", "cli", "index.ts");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/warden.jsView on unpkg · L22

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = bin/warden.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/warden.jsView on unpkg

11try { L12: const mod = await import(pathToFileURL(cliPath).href); L13: // dist/cli.js only auto-runs runCli() when it's the direct entry point.

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/warden.jsView on unpkg · L11

dist/index.jsView file

20Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L20: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L21: var getFilename, getDirname, __dirname; L22: var init_esm_shims = __esm({ ... L612: init_guard(); L613: HEADER_RE = /^\s*(export\s+)?(async\s+)?(function|class|def|interface|type|enum|struct|impl|pub fn|fn|const|public|private|protected|static)\b.*$/; L614: IMPORT_RE = /^\s*(import\s+|from\s+\S+\s+import\s+|export\s+.*\s+from\s+|use\s+\S+::|#include\s+|require\s*\()/; ... L1953: function currentLevel() { L1954: const env = (process.env.WARDEN_DEBUG ?? "").toLowerCase(); L1955: if (env === "1" || env === "true" || env === "debug") return LEVELS.debug; ... L2044: try { L2045: parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed); L2046: } catc

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L20

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.cjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 1da75682d90f2f56 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

dist/cli.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 50-90json

50 "benchmarks/HONEST-NUMBERS.md",

51 "README.md",

52 "LICENSE",

53 "TRADEMARK.md"

54 ],

55 "engines": {

56 "node": ">=22.5.0"

57 },

58 "scripts": {

59 "build": "tsup && tsc --emitDeclarationOnly --outDir dist",

60 "dev": "tsup --watch",

61 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",

62 "format": "prettier --write .",

63 "format:check": "prettier --check .",

64 "warden": "tsx src/cli/index.ts",

65 "serve": "tsx src/cli/index.ts serve",

66 "smoke": "tsx src/cli/index.ts status",

67 "test": "vitest run",

68 "test:watch": "vitest",

69 "prepublishOnly": "npm run build",

70 "postinstall": "node bin/postinstall.cjs"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L70

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L70

71 },

72 "dependencies": {

73 "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.29.0",

74 "chalk": "5.6.2",

75 "commander": "15.0.0",

76 "tree-sitter-wasms": "^0.1.13",

77 "web-tree-sitter": "^0.22.6",

78 "zod": "4.4.3"

79 },

80 "devDependencies": {

81 "@types/node": "26.1.1",

82 "prettier": "3.9.5",

83 "puppeteer": "^25.5.0",

84 "tsup": "8.5.1",

85 "tsx": "4.23.1",

86 "typescript": "7.0.2",

87 "vitest": "^4.1.10"

88 }

89}

90

bin/warden.jsView file

Lines 1-32javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// Warden CLI entrypoint. Delegates to the compiled CLI so the published

3// package works without tsx. In development, run via `npm run warden`.

4import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

5import { resolve, dirname } from "node:path";

6import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url"

dist/index.jsView file

Lines 1-40javascript

1// warden — provably-safe context layer for AI coding agents

2var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;

3var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;

4var __require = /* @__PURE__ */ ((x) => typeof require !== "undefined"

bin/postinstall.cjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 1da75682d90f2f56 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

dist/cli.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.5.0 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg