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warden-ai@0.7.0: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / warden-ai / 0.7.0

warden-ai@0.7.0

Verified context for AI coding agents. A local context layer that intelligently compresses, filters, indexes, and verifies AI coding-agent tool output. 32 MCP tools across 10 layers: code intelligence (tree-sitter, 30+ languages), context selection, tool

AI Security Review

scanned 13h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. On npm installation, the package silently invokes initialization in the consumer project. Initialization registers an MCP server, modifies broad third-party AI-agent configuration and rules files, and enables automatic approval for its tools.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

npm postinstall

Impact

Persists Warden as an auto-approved tool across AI coding agents without user consent.

Mechanism

silent cross-agent MCP registration, rule injection, and approval-policy mutation

Policy narrative

Installing the package runs a hidden postinstall hook that executes `warden init` in the consumer’s current project. That initializer registers the package as an MCP server in numerous user and project AI-agent configurations, writes global instruction/rule files, and sets Warden tools to automatic approval in Codex and Cline. These changes affect foreign, broad agent control surfaces without an explicit user setup command.

Rationale

The concrete install-time behavior is unconsented mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including auto-approval policy changes. This meets the blocking boundary even though no network exfiltration was identified.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/postinstall.cjsdist/cli.js$HOME/.claude.json$HOME/.codex/config.toml$HOME/.cursor/mcp.json$HOME/.gemini/settings.json.mcp.json

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.cjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/postinstall.cjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/warden.jsView file

22// Compiled output not present — fall back to tsx for dev convenience. L23: const { spawn } = await import("node:child_process"); L24: const src = resolve(here, "..", "src", "cli", "index.ts");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/warden.jsView on unpkg · L22

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = bin/warden.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/warden.jsView on unpkg

11try { L12: const mod = await import(pathToFileURL(cliPath).href); L13: // dist/cli.js only auto-runs runCli() when it's the direct entry point.

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/warden.jsView on unpkg · L11

dist/index.jsView file

20Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L20: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L21: var getFilename, getDirname, __dirname; L22: var init_esm_shims = __esm({ ... L612: init_guard(); L613: HEADER_RE = /^\s*(export\s+)?(async\s+)?(function|class|def|interface|type|enum|struct|impl|pub fn|fn|const|public|private|protected|static)\b.*$/; L614: IMPORT_RE = /^\s*(import\s+|from\s+\S+\s+import\s+|export\s+.*\s+from\s+|use\s+\S+::|#include\s+|require\s*\()/; ... L1949: function currentLevel() { L1950: const env = (process.env.WARDEN_DEBUG ?? "").toLowerCase(); L1951: if (env === "1" || env === "true" || env === "debug") return LEVELS.debug; ... L2040: try { L2041: parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed); L2042: } catc

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L20

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.cjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 1da75682d90f2f56 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

dist/cli.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 53-93json

53 "benchmarks/HONEST-NUMBERS.md",

54 "README.md",

55 "LICENSE",

56 "TRADEMARK.md"

57 ],

58 "engines": {

59 "node": ">=22.5.0"

60 },

61 "scripts": {

62 "build": "tsup && tsc --emitDeclarationOnly --outDir dist",

63 "dev": "tsup --watch",

64 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",

65 "format": "prettier --write .",

66 "format:check": "prettier --check .",

67 "warden": "tsx src/cli/index.ts",

68 "serve": "tsx src/cli/index.ts serve",

69 "smoke": "tsx src/cli/index.ts status",

70 "test": "vitest run",

71 "test:watch": "vitest",

72 "prepublishOnly": "npm run build",

73 "postinstall": "node bin/postinstall.cjs"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L73

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L73

74 },

75 "dependencies": {

76 "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "1.29.0",

77 "@xenova/transformers": "2.17.2",

78 "chalk": "5.6.2",

79 "commander": "15.0.0",

80 "tree-sitter-wasms": "^0.1.13",

81 "web-tree-sitter": "^0.22.6",

82 "zod": "4.4.3"

83 },

84 "devDependencies": {

85 "@types/node": "26.1.1",

86 "prettier": "3.9.5",

87 "puppeteer": "^25.5.0",

88 "tsup": "8.5.1",

89 "tsx": "4.23.1",

90 "typescript": "7.0.2",

91 "vitest": "^4.1.10"

92 }

93}

bin/warden.jsView file

Lines 1-32javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// Warden CLI entrypoint. Delegates to the compiled CLI so the published

3// package works without tsx. In development, run via `npm run warden`.

4import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

5import { resolve, dirname } from "node:path";

6import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url"

dist/index.jsView file

20Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/index.js spawns dist/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L20: import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; L21: var getFilename, getDirname, __dirname; L22: var init_esm_shims = __esm({ ... L612: init_guard(); L613: HEADER_RE = /^\s*(export\s+)?(async\s+)?(function|class|def|interface|type|enum|struct|impl|pub fn|fn|const|public|private|protected|static)\b.*$/; L614: IMPORT_RE = /^\s*(import\s+|from\s+\S+\s+import\s+|export\s+.*\s+from\s+|use\s+\S+::|#include\s+|require\s*\()/; ... L1949: function currentLevel() { L1950: const env = (process.env.WARDEN_DEBUG ?? "").toLowerCase(); L1951: if (env === "1" || env === "true" || env === "debug") return LEVELS.debug; ... L2040: try { L2041: parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed); L2042: } catc

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L20

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg

bin/postinstall.cjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 1da75682d90f2f56 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = bin/postinstall.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 3 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/postinstall.cjsView on unpkg

dist/cli.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = warden-ai@0.6.1 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:d2FyZGVuLWFp:0.6.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg