wellnpm@3.0.2

wellnpm@2.0.9 ships a 24MB ELF binary named `launch` which is the XMRig Monero miner (RandomX, cn/upx2, ghostrider algorithm strings, libuv/OpenSSL linkage, hashvault pool references). `package.json` declares `"main": "launch"` and `"scripts.start": "./launch"`, so running `npm start` on this package immediately launches the miner. A bundled `config.json` is pre-configured against `pool.hashvault.pro:80` with the hardcoded recipient wallet `4AUTfJGTvT8A98PSE99EunfrnUbkWe9vU3FN3qsABQLP5aPKQuvWS5sCaD9WaXFQUqNtDLb9dcxiBgJiWCfjvDXp5ptWDYG`, so all hashrate from victim machines is credited to the author. A second `scripts.deploy` script targets Android Termux: it moves `libuv.so` into `/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/lib`, chmod+x's the `xmr` and `edit` shell wrappers, and copies them into `/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin` so the miner becomes a persistent, PATH-resolvable command in the user's Termux environment. The wrappers themselves are one-liners that `cd node_modules/wellnpm && npm start`. README does not mention mining; metadata is placeholder (`author: Your Name <wellenterprise81.gmail.com>`, `description: A brief description of your package`). This is a cryptojacking dropper masquerading as an npm module. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8e91f40e7af1730f15a357bb3074c7d208765ba41598c35373ed5b3b374d607a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.