---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/wertybailz"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/wertybailz/v/1.0.9.md"
package: "wertybailz"
report_status: "published"
title: "wertybailz@1.0.9 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "1.0.9"
---

# wertybailz@1.0.9 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — Uses the user's account to follow a channel chosen by the package publisher without the user's request.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Block by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 1.0.9
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The ordinary message-send socket setup triggers an unconditional follow of a publisher-selected WhatsApp newsletter using the user's account. This is an unrequested account action, so the package is malicious.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-10T01:20:44.017Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-10T01:21:53.566Z
- **Download time:** 501 ms
- **Static scan time:** 4433 ms
- **AI review time:** 64613 ms
- **Total time:** 69549 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatically follows a hard-coded WhatsApp newsletter using the user's authenticated connection.

- **Trigger:** A normal message-send socket is constructed; the follow request is scheduled for 10 seconds later.

- **Impact:** Uses the user's account to follow a channel chosen by the package publisher without the user's request.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/newsletter.js, lib/Socket/messages-send.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-10T01:21:53.566Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The newsletter socket decodes a hard-coded channel ID and sends a FOLLOW query through the WhatsApp socket.

- **Attack narrative:** When the package creates its normal message-send socket, it also creates a newsletter socket. That constructor schedules a WhatsApp FOLLOW request for a hard-coded newsletter ID after 10 seconds. This uses the user's authenticated WhatsApp connection to follow a publisher-selected channel without a user request.

- **Rationale:** The ordinary message-send socket setup triggers an unconditional follow of a publisher-selected WhatsApp newsletter using the user's account. This is an unrequested account action, so the package is malicious.

- **Network endpoints:** WhatsApp newsletter service (via S\_WHATSAPP\_NET)

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The newsletter socket hard-codes publisher-selected channel ID 120363426748858626@newsletter., Constructing the newsletter socket schedules a FOLLOW request to that channel after 10 seconds, without a user action., The normal message-send socket constructs the newsletter socket, so the follow is triggered during ordinary socket setup.

- **Evidence against:** The package preinstall hook only checks the Node.js major version and exits for versions below 20., The flagged media helper uses ffmpeg to extract image thumbnails, a function relevant to WhatsApp media handling.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to wertybailz@1.0.9.

- Avoid installing wertybailz@1.0.9. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 5. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L107: pull: false,
L108: devicePairingData: {
L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L158: ]);
L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 9. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 10. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 302
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 11. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/WAProto/index.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = WAProto/index.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 4435208
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. Medium: Git Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package manifest contains a git dependency.

### 14. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/WAProto/index.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 4
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @randev404/baileys@1.0.0
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHJhbmRldjQwNC9iYWlsZXlz:1.0.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = b61bf6f4901ae663
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = @zeppeliorg/xzcbailz@1.0.1
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHplcHBlbGlvcmcveHpjYmFpbHo:1.0.1
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 14
summary = package final verdict is malicious
```

### 17. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 18. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/wertybailz@1.0.9/lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```typescript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 20
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall, prepare
- **Dependencies:** 13
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 31
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 17

### Published dependency entries
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- libsignal github:tenka-san/libsignal-node (Dependency)
- lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency)
- p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- pino ^9.6 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^7.5.6 (Dependency)
- whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.4 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency)
- jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** wertybailz
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.0.9
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-06-17T10:55:43.384Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-10T01:20:56.466Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-10T01:21:53.566Z
- **Known versions:** 7
- **Latest version:** 1.0.13
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** A WebSockets library for interacting with WhatsApp Web
- **Author:** Rajeh Taher - 7eppsynC
- **Keywords:** whatsapp, automation, baileys, wa-bot, whatsapp api, whatsapp web, wa bot, whatsapp bot
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 218
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 7,263,550 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/wertybailz/v/1.0.9>)
- [Repository](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/xzcbailz>)
- [OpenSSF/OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-19033>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/wertybailz>)
- [WEB](<https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/>)
