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whalibmob@5.33.3: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / whalibmob / 5.33.3

whalibmob@5.33.3

Node.js library for WhatsApp — register a number over SMS, or link as a companion by QR. Signal E2E encryption, media, groups, channels.

AI Security Review

scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No malicious attack surface was identified in the inspected required files. The package contains WhatsApp-related token and APNs activation functionality.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

No malicious trigger was identified; APNs activation runs only when its activation function is called.

Impact

No unconsented installation action, credential exfiltration, persistence, or destructive behavior was established.

Mechanism

The inspected network operation posts an activation request to a fixed Apple host; Android material is processed locally.

AI rationale

The package has no install lifecycle hook and the required modules show bounded protocol, token, and APK-processing behavior. Static inspection found no concrete malicious behavior.

Network endpoints1

albert.apple.com/WebObjects/ALUnbrick.woa/wa/deviceActivation

OSV advisory

OpenSSF/OSV

Advisory

MAL-2026-17408

Source

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV

Summary

Malicious code in whalibmob (npm)

Details

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: whalibmob (npm), version(s): 5.33.5, 5.33.4, 5.33.3, 5.33.2, 5.32.2, 5.32.1, 5.32.0, 5.30.0, 5.29.6, 5.29.5, 5.29.4, 5.29.3, 5.29.2, 5.29.1, 5.29.0, 5.28.0, 5.25.0, 5.24.2, 5.24.1, 5.24.0.

Source & flagged code

9 flagged · loading source

lib/tokens.jsView file

145patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 145

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

lib/tokens.jsView on unpkg · L145

145patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 145

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in lib/tokens.js

lib/tokens.jsView on unpkg · L145

tools/diagnose-405.jsView file

22L23: const path = require('path'); L24: const os = require('os');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

tools/diagnose-405.jsView on unpkg · L22

lib/Registration.jsView file

3const crypto = require('crypto'); L4: const https = require('https'); L5: const tls = require('tls'); ... L103: L104: tlsSocket.write(req); L105: L106: const { status, body: bodyBuf } = await readHttpResponse(tlsSocket, path); L107: const bodyStr = bodyBuf.toString('utf8'); L108: ... L498: L499: const mcc = (opts && opts.simMcc) || process.env.WA_SIM_MCC; L500: const mnc = (opts && opts.simMnc) || process.env.WA_SIM_MNC;

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

lib/Registration.jsView on unpkg · L3

lib/apns.jsView file

33L34: const https = require('https'); L35: const crypto = require('crypto'); ... L69: // L70: // The private key is a PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey, DER, base64. It is 1024-bit, which L71: // is not a choice — it is the key that matches the leaf of the chain. L72: L73: const FAIRPLAY_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS1 = Buffer.from([ L74: '[redacted]', ... L327: res.on('data', c => chunks.push(c)); L328: res.on('end', () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode || 0, body: Buffer.concat(chunks) })); L329: res.on('error', reject);

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

lib/apns.jsView on unpkg · L33

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = whalibmob@5.29.6 matchedIdentity = npm:d2hhbGlibW9i:5.29.6 similarity = 0.960 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

lib/apns.jsView on unpkg

lib/AndroidApk.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 9

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

lib/AndroidApk.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

lib/fcm.jsView file

49patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 49

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in lib/fcm.js

lib/fcm.jsView on unpkg · L49

57patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 57

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in lib/fcm.js

lib/fcm.jsView on unpkg · L57

Source & flagged code

9 flagged

lib/tokens.jsView file

Lines 125-165javascript

125 '450','fbid:thread','bloks_session_state','America/Lima','attachment_picker_refresh',

126 'download_host_switching_enabled','1792','u_aud_limit_sil_restarts_test2','custom_urls',

127 'device_fanout','optimistic_upload','2000','key_cipher_suite',

128 'web_smb_upsell_in_biz_profile_enabled','e','039','siri_post_status_shortcut','pair-device',

129 'lg','lc','stream_attribution_url','model','mspjpeg_phash_gen','catalog_send_all',

130 'new_multi_vcards_ui','share_biz_vcard_enabled','-','clean','200','md_blocklist_v2_server',

131 '03b','03a','web_md_migration_experience','ptt_conversation_waveform',

132 'u_aud_limit_sil_restarts_test1'

133];

134

135const DICT_2 = [

136 '64','ptt_playback_speed_enabled','web_product_list_message_enabled','paid_convo_ts','27',

137 'manufacturer','psp-routing','grp_uii_cleanup','ptt_draft_enabled','03c',

138 'business_initiated','web_catalog_products_onoff','web_upload_link_thumb_mms_enabled','03e',

139 'mediaretry','35','hfm_string_changes','28','America/Fortaleza','max_keys','md_mhfs_days',

140 'streaming_upload_chunk_size','5541','040','03d','2675','03f','...','512','mute','48','041',

141 'alt_jpeg_quality','60','042','md_smb_quick_reply','5183','c','1343','40','1230','043','044',

142 'mms_cat_v1_forward_hot_override_enabled','user_notice','ptt_waveform_send','047',

143 'Asia/Calcutta','250','md_privacy_v2','31','29','128','md_messaging_enabled','046','crypto',

144 '690','045','enc_iv','75','failure','ptt_oot_playback',

145 'AIzaSyDR5yfaG7OG8sMTUj8kfQEb8T9pN8BM6Lk','w','048','2201','web_large_files_ui',

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

lib/tokens.jsView on unpkg · L145

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in lib/tokens.js

lib/tokens.jsView on unpkg · L145

146 'Asia/Makassar','812','status_collapse_muted','1334','257','2HP4dm','049','patches','1290',

147 '43cY6T','America/Caracas','web_sticker_maker','campaign','ptt_pausable_enabled','33','42',

148 'attestation','biz','04b','query_linked','s','125','04a','810','availability','1411',

149 'responsiveness_v2_m1','catalog_not_created','34','America/Santiago','1465','enc_p','04d',

150 'status_info','04f','key_version','..','04c','04e','md_group_notification','1598','1215',

151 'web_cart_enabled','37','630','1920','2394','-1','vcard','38','elapsed','36','828','peer',

152 'pricing_category','1245','invalid','stella_ios_enabled','2687','45','1528','39',

153 'u_is_redial_audio_1104_ctrl','1025','1455','58','2524','2603','054',

154 'bsp_system_message_enabled','web_pip_redesign','051','verify_apps','1974','1272','1322',

155 '1755','052','70','050','1063','1135','1361','80','1096','1828','1851','1251','1921',

156 'key_config_id','1254','1566','1252','2525','critical_block','1669','max_available',

157 'w:auth:backup:token','product','2530','870','1022','participant_uuid','web_cart_on_off',

158 '1255','1432','1867','41','1415','1440','240','1204','1608','1690','1846','1483','1687',

159 '1749','69','url_number','053','1325','1040','365','59','Asia/Riyadh','1177',

160 'test_recommended','057','1612','43','1061','1518','1635','055','1034','1375','750','1430',

161 'event_code','1682','503','55','865','78','1309','1365','44','America/Guayaquil','535',

162 'LIMITED','1377','1613','1420','1599','1822','05a','1681','password','1111','1214','1376',

163 '1478','47','1082','4282','Europe/Istanbul','1307','46','058','1124','256','rate-overlimit',

164 'retail','u_a_socket_err_fix_succ_test','1292','1370','1388','520','861','psa','regular',

165 '1181','1766','05b','1183','1213','1304','1537'

tools/diagnose-405.jsView file

Lines 2-42javascript

2'use strict';

3//

4// Asks the server which part of the login it objects to.

5//

6// node tools/diagnose-405.js <phone> [--session <dir>]

7//

8// A 405 says "client outdated" and names nothing else, so the only way to find

9// out what it actually dislikes is to vary one thing at a time and read the

10// answer. Each row below is one login attempt with the session already on disk:

11// nothing is registered, no code is requested, and the session is never

lib/Registration.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1'use strict';

2

3const crypto = require('crypto');

4const https = require('https');

5const

lib/apns.jsView file

Lines 13-53javascript

13// place:

14//

15// 1. activation albert.apple.com signs a device certificate for a keypair

16// we generate, given a FairPlay-signed request. This is what

17// a Mac or an iPhone does on first boot, and what every

18// desktop iMessage/APNs client has done since. The

19// certificate Apple signs is good for a year, so it is

20// persisted with the account and the handshake runs once.

21// 2. courier one TLS connection to Apple carrying the device token, and

22// over it GET_TOKEN for net.whatsapp.WhatsApp — the per-topic

lib/AndroidApk.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 9

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

lib/AndroidApk.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

lib/fcm.jsView file

Lines 29-77javascript

29// the reason a registration cannot be attempted.

30//

31// The session is persisted with the account. Google hands out an android id

32// once and expects it to keep coming back; re-running checkin on every

33// registration step would mint a new device each time, which is itself a

34// pattern no real phone produces.

35

36const https = require('https');