registry  /  wigolo  /  0.1.39-beta.0

wigolo@0.1.39-beta.0

Local-first web intelligence MCP server for AI coding agents

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was established by source inspection. The package is an MCP/web intelligence CLI with user-invoked setup, warmup, crawling, local cache, and optional plugin behavior.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User runs wigolo CLI commands such as setup, warmup, serve/mcp, fetch/search/crawl, or installs local plugins.
Impact
Expected local configuration/cache changes and outbound web/bootstrap requests when invoked; no evidence of credential harvesting, install-time execution, or covert exfiltration.
Mechanism
package-aligned CLI, MCP server, web fetching, local bootstrap, and user config writes
Rationale
The risky primitives are tied to documented, user-invoked web intelligence/MCP setup functionality, and I found no lifecycle hook, import-time payload, covert credential collection, destructive behavior, or exfiltration endpoint. Dynamic imports and command execution are bounded to local plugins, Playwright/SearXNG/bootstrap, Docker, and agent config setup workflows.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/cli/setup-mcp.jsdist/cli/tui/config-writer.jsdist/cli/warmup.jsdist/searxng/bootstrap.jsdist/searxng/docker.jsdist/watch/ssrf.jsdist/plugins/loader.jsdist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.jsdist/cli/doctor.js~/.wigolo/config.json~/.wigolo/searxng~/.wigolo/state.json~/.wigolo/bootstrap.lock~/.wigolo/searxng.lockagent MCP config paths selected by setup
Network endpoints2
github.com/searxng/searxng/archive/refs/heads/master.tar.gz127.0.0.1:<searxngPort>/healthz

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • CLI commands can modify user agent MCP configs when explicitly run: dist/cli/setup-mcp.js -> dist/cli/tui/config-writer.js.
  • Runtime warmup downloads Playwright browsers/ML models and bootstraps SearXNG from GitHub on user command: dist/cli/warmup.js, dist/searxng/bootstrap.js.
  • Plugin loader dynamically imports user-installed plugins from configured pluginsDir: dist/plugins/loader.js.
  • SearXNG Docker mode runs docker commands for local container management: dist/searxng/docker.js.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks; entrypoint only dispatches CLI commands.
  • Config writes are user-invoked setup/init behavior for MCP integration, not install-time or import-time mutation.
  • Network use is package-aligned web search/fetch/crawl and local SearXNG/bootstrap functionality; no hardcoded exfiltration endpoint found.
  • dist/watch/ssrf.js blocks localhost/private IPv4/IPv6 and metadata hostnames including metadata.google.internal and 169.254/16.
  • dist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.js is an Amazon product-page parser; inspected code shows parsing logic, not hidden execution or exfiltration.
  • Doctor masks API keys when reporting env/key-store status rather than printing full secrets.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNativeBindingsNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
CopyleftLicense
scanned 366 file(s), 1.27 MB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.github.com, api.search.brave.com, api.semanticscholar.org, api.stackexchange.com, api2.marginalia-search.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, devdocs.io, developer.mozilla.org, duckduckgo.com, example.com, export.arxiv.org, github.com, hn.algolia.com, lite.duckduckgo.com, lobste.rs, news.ycombinator.com, python.org, twitter.com, www.bing.com, www.example.com, www.google.com, www.mojeek.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source
dist/searxng/docker.jsView file
1import { execSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { getConfig } from "../config.js";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/searxng/docker.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/plugins/loader.jsView file
84const fileUrl = pathToFileURL(entryPath).href; L85: mod = await import(fileUrl); L86: } catch (err) {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/plugins/loader.jsView on unpkg · L84
dist/search/evidence.jsView file
1import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; L2: import { extractHighlights } from "./highlights.js";
Low
Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/search/evidence.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/watch/ssrf.jsView file
1const ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["http:", "https:"]); L2: const PRIVATE_HOSTNAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([ L3: "localhost", ... L69: reason: `${fieldLabel} is not a valid URL`, L70: hint: 'Pass a fully qualified http(s) URL (e.g. "https://example.com/path").' L71: };
High
Cloud Metadata Access

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

dist/watch/ssrf.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.jsView file
249contains invisible/control Unicode U+200D (zero width joiner) const cleaned = raw.replace(/[<U+200D><U+200E><U+200F><U+200B>]/g, "").trim();
Critical
Trojan Source Unicode

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

dist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.jsView on unpkg · L249
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/index.js -> dist/cli/mcp.js -> dist/server.js -> dist/extraction/pipeline.js -> dist/extraction/v1/site-extractors.js -> dist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.js Reachable file contains a blocking source-risk pattern.
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.jsView on unpkg
dist/cli/doctor.jsView file
61try { L62: const r = spawnSync("npx", ["playwright", "--version"], { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 5e3 }); L63: if (r.status === 0) {
High
Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/cli/doctor.jsView on unpkg · L61

Findings

2 Critical4 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodedist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/extraction/site-extractors/amazon.js
HighChild Processdist/searxng/docker.js
HighShell
HighCloud Metadata Accessdist/watch/ssrf.js
HighRuntime Package Installdist/cli/doctor.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/plugins/loader.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/search/evidence.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowCopyleft License