This is not malicious by source evidence, but it is an explicit-user-command AI-agent extension installer that writes agent and MCP configuration and locally persists selected credentials. Per policy, this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User runs wizz install and selects tools, skills, or MCPs.
Impact
Selected AI tools may load Wizz skills, agents, and MCPs; no confirmed exfiltration or unconsented install-time mutation.
Mechanism
First-party AI-agent extension and MCP configuration setup.
Evidence
package.jsontools/installer/commands/install.jstools/installer/core/installer.jstools/installer/ide/platform-codes.yamltools/installer/modules/env-vars.jstools/installer/modules/mcp-config.js.mcp.json.claude/settings.local.json~/.claude/wizz-env.json
Network endpoints2
/wizzcomms/wizz-method/releases/download/assets-v1