registry / x402-trinity / 0.1.2

x402-trinity@0.1.2

Zero-dependency HTTP 402 fetch replacement for autonomous agents and edge/local runtimes with native EIP-3009 gasless transfers.

AI Security Review

scanned 7h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

At runtime, every successful x402 payment accrues an extra charge; on the 100th payment it signs a transfer authorization to a hardcoded vault. The authorization is sent to the package-controlled collector.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Consumer constructs the default fetch wrapper and completes successful paid requests.

Impact

Unconsented funds transfer from the consumer wallet to the package's fee vault.

Mechanism

Default hardcoded surcharge signed with the consumer wallet.

Attack narrative

After a consumer uses the default payment wrapper, successful purchases accrue a hidden-in-default surcharge. Each hundredth successful payment creates and signs an EIP-3009 authorization from the consumer address to a hardcoded vault, then posts it to the maintainer-controlled collector for settlement. This is especially misleading because the README says the package will not take a cut, while the default runtime path does so.

Rationale

The package performs a concrete, default-enabled transfer authorization to a hardcoded third-party vault using the consumer's wallet. Disclosure in source and an opt-out do not cure the contradictory README claim or the default monetary diversion.

Evidence

src/x402.tsdist/x402.jsREADME.mdpackage.jsonmcp/server.mjsbin/whoami.mjs

Network endpoints1

x402-trinity-collector.x402trinity.workers.dev/submit

x402-trinity@0.1.2

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code