xyt-agentos@1.1.3
XYT AgentOS — Workent 龙虾桌面 Agent 客户端(xyt-client)
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an obfuscated agent-management client with an unprompted install-time persistence action and runtime cross-agent extension capability. No concrete install-time AI-agent takeover, credential theft, or exfiltration chain was confirmed.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Install hook runs automatically and edits shell startup files.
- Obfuscated runtime manages skills under foreign AI-agent directories including .codex and .claude.
- Runtime can synchronize downloaded skills into agent control surfaces.
- The install hook only changes PATH; it does not access agent directories or network.
- No concrete credential exfiltration or remote-payload execution was established from the inspected source.
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/socket-server.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to xyt-agentos@1.1.3.
See all versions of xyt-agentos for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of xyt-agentos@1.1.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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