yakuza0@2.23.40

The package ships code that binds outbound network calls to a hardcoded non-standard host, https://registry-pxnpm.rdc.nfjbill.ren, from cli/index.js (fetch calls at lines 513, 554, 623 alongside a reference to process.versions for host fingerprinting). Additional files server/proxy/tire.js and server/proxy/csrf.js combine child_process usage with curl-based POST/GET operations, mixing shell command execution with outbound HTTP to non-registry endpoints. The destination host is not the npm registry or a documented publisher domain; its name mimics the format of a private npm registry, and it is invoked from top-level module code paths rather than a user-invoked API. The composition — hardcoded attacker-shaped endpoint, runtime process/version fingerprinting, curl-driven POSTs, and child_process shell execution wired to the same network paths — matches the shape of installer-targeted exfiltration and remote command execution.