yangming8@1.0.0

The tarball's only shipped file is index.html, declared as the package's `main`. There are no lifecycle scripts, no JavaScript entry point, no dependencies, and no library surface — installing or `require()`-ing the package does not execute the payload on the installer's machine. The HTML presents a fake Cloudflare 'Just a moment...' verification page and, after a 1-second setTimeout, runs obfuscator.io-style JavaScript that reconstructs a destination URL from split string literals ('gin.microc' + 'loud.homes' + '/') and calls window.location.replace on it, forwarding the original query string. The destination is a lookalike domain at login.microcloud.homes (impersonating MicroCloud). The package appears to exist solely to host the phishing lander for retrieval via npm CDN mirrors (unpkg/jsdelivr), abusing the registry as static hosting for a browser-side credential-phishing page. Because the harm targets end users who load the HTML in a browser via a CDN URL — not developers who `npm install` this package — the installer-side risk is minimal, but the abusive distribution warrants registry takedown. ## Source: ghsa-malware (aa316875bcf3fb2f59289a42cce758fa48fae241b1f11cce2a4fc97795c2366d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.