---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/yukistage"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/yukistage/report.md"
package: "yukistage"
report_status: "published"
title: "yukistage@1.1.7 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "1.1.7"
---

# yukistage@1.1.7 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — The user's WhatsApp account performs an unsolicited follow action chosen by the package publisher.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Block by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 1.1.7
- **Selected version is latest:** Yes
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The package silently uses the user's WhatsApp account to follow a publisher-selected newsletter whenever a socket connects. Because the account action is automatic and not requested, this is malicious.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-10T01:22:02.926Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-10T01:22:45.221Z
- **Download time:** 504 ms
- **Static scan time:** 5696 ms
- **AI review time:** 36094 ms
- **Total time:** 42295 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** By default, creating a WhatsApp socket causes the account to follow a publisher-selected newsletter.

- **Trigger:** The application creates a socket and its WhatsApp connection opens; the action runs after a 90-second delay by default.

- **Impact:** The user's WhatsApp account performs an unsolicited follow action chosen by the package publisher.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Defaults/index.js, lib/Socket/index.js, lib/Socket/newsletter.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-10T01:22:45.221Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The package sends a WhatsApp FOLLOW query containing the hard-coded newsletter ID. The option to disable this behavior defaults to enabled.

- **Attack narrative:** When an application creates a socket, the package schedules a follow action after the WhatsApp connection opens. It sends a FOLLOW query for the hard-coded newsletter 120363400911374213@newsletter. This uses the user's authenticated WhatsApp account without an explicit request; the opt-out setting is enabled by default.

- **Rationale:** The package silently uses the user's WhatsApp account to follow a publisher-selected newsletter whenever a socket connects. Because the account action is automatic and not requested, this is malicious.

- **Network endpoints:** WhatsApp service via S\_WHATSAPP\_NET

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** Socket creation calls triggerAutoFollow using merged defaults., Auto-follow is enabled by default and targets the publisher-selected newsletter 120363400911374213@newsletter., After the WhatsApp connection opens, the package waits 90 seconds and runs the follow task., The task sends a WhatsApp FOLLOW query for the selected newsletter without a user request.

- **Evidence against:** The package is a WhatsApp client library, so communicating with WhatsApp is part of its stated purpose., The package manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle scripts., The follow behavior can be disabled through autoFollowNewsletterOnConnect.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to yukistage@1.1.7.

- Avoid installing yukistage@1.1.7. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 3. Low: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 45.0%

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/MessageBuilder.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/MessageBuilder.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2332: const __dirname = path.dirname(__filename);
L2333: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L2334:
```

### 5. Medium: Unsafe Vm Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 68.0%
- **Path:** lib/MessageBuilder.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/MessageBuilder.js>)

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L16: * WhatsApp: wa.me/6285188349341
L17: * Channel: https://whatsapp.[redacted]
L18: *
...
L52: key: ie.key,
L53: metadata: {
L54: display_name: ie.text,
...
L256: if (!response.ok) throw Error(`HTTP ${response.status}`);
L257: return Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());
L258: } catch (error) {
...
L1610: 'override',
L1611: 'private',
L1612: 'protected',
```

### 6. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L104: pull: false,
L105: devicePairingData: {
L106: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L131: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L132: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L133: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L155: ]);
L156: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L157: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
```

### 7. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 10. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 11. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 302
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 12. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/WAProto/index.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = WAProto/index.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 6656208
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 14. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/WAProto/index.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_path_work_budget_exceeded; limitedFiles = 4
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = vlyzer-baileys@1.0.4
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:dmx5emVyLWJhaWxleXM:1.0.4
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = yukistage@1.1.5
matchedIdentity = npm:eXVraXN0YWdl:1.1.5
similarity = 0.560
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

### 17. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 18. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/yukistage@1.1.7/lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.d.ts

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```typescript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 20
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 14
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 31
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 18

### Published dependency entries
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- fflate ^0.8.0 (Dependency)
- fluent-ffmpeg ^2.1.2 (Dependency)
- libsignal ^6.0.0 (Dependency)
- lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^11.7.0 (Dependency)
- p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- pino ^9.6 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^7.2.4 (Dependency)
- sharp ^0.33.5 (Dependency)
- whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.2 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency)
- jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** yukistage
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.1.7
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-07-19T06:03:32.885Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-10T01:22:45.221Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-11T06:48:07.663Z
- **Known versions:** 2
- **Latest version:** 1.1.7
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** YukiStage — Modded Baileys v7 with interactive message, album, AIRich, and newsletter support for Yuki AI.
- **Author:** ZetaGo-Aurum
- **Keywords:** whatsapp, automation, yukistage, baileys, ourin-baileys, yuki-ai
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 420
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 10,382,079 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/yukistage>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/ZetaGo-Aurum/YukiStage.git>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/ZetaGo-Aurum/YukiStage>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/ZetaGo-Aurum/YukiStage/issues>)
- [OpenSSF/OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-19042>)
- [PACKAGE](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/yukistage>)
- [WEB](<https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/>)
