---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server/v/0.43.4"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server/v/0.43.4.md"
package: "zcode-acp-server"
report_status: "published"
title: "zcode-acp-server@0.43.4 npm security report"
verdict: "clean"
version: "0.43.4"
---

# zcode-acp-server@0.43.4 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — 20 low-signal patterns reviewed and cleared.

- **Verdict:** Clean
- **Product-default install policy:** Allow
- **Firewall policy:** No policy match
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** None published
- **Selected version:** 0.43.4
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Source inspection found that postinstall's authenticated request is restricted to the local hub and requires a configured token. Other cited excerpts are consistent with ACP bridge, sandbox, runtime, and hub behavior; no concrete attack was identified.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Clean
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 85.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-07T20:07:20.888Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-07T20:07:46.928Z
- **Download time:** 508 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1206 ms
- **AI review time:** 24325 ms
- **Total time:** 26040 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No confirmed attack surface was identified. The postinstall notifier contacts a loopback hub using the configured token, and the inspected runtime modules align with the package’s ACP bridge and hub functions.

- **Trigger:** Package installation invokes the postinstall notifier; the request occurs only when a hub token is configured.

- **Impact:** A running local hub may check whether it should restart onto an updated build; no malicious impact was established.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-07T20:07:46.928Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The notifier sends an authenticated upgrade request to the configured hub port on 127.0.0.1. Inspected excerpts do not establish external credential forwarding or a malicious payload.

- **Rationale:** Source inspection found that postinstall's authenticated request is restricted to the local hub and requires a configured token. Other cited excerpts are consistent with ACP bridge, sandbox, runtime, and hub behavior; no concrete attack was identified.

- **Network endpoints:** 127.0.0.1

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Clean

- **Confidence:** 85.0%

- **Recommended action:** mark\_clean

- **Intent class:** Benign

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for AI clean decision:** The postinstall hook runs a notifier that reads configured hub credentials and sends them only to a loopback hub endpoint., The notifier returns without a token and limits its request to localhost; this supports a package-aligned upgrade notification, not credential exfiltration., The flagged modules show ACP process management, an opt-in backend sandbox, runtime selection, TUI wiring, and hub service code; inspected excerpts show no concrete malicious action.

- **Evidence against:** The package defines a postinstall hook that sends a request to the local hub when a token is configured., Hub sandbox code imports process execution and filesystem primitives, which warrant review in context.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to zcode-acp-server@0.43.4.

- No action is needed for zcode-acp-server@0.43.4. Pin the version in your lockfile and check new releases as they are scanned.

## Public findings

These are automated scan signals. The review checked each one and found no malicious behavior, so all of them are cleared.

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node dist/remote/hub-upgrade-notify.js 2>/dev/null || true
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node dist/remote/hub-upgrade-notify.js 2>/dev/null || true
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. Medium: Network (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Medium: Install Persistence (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L14: */
L15: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L16: import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L29: /** Whether this process was born inside our Seatbelt wrap. */
L30: export function sandboxBorn(env = process.env) {
L31: return process.platform === "darwin" && (env[SANDBOX_ACTIVE_ENV] ?? "").trim() !== "";
L32: }
...
L41: /**
L42: * The LaunchAgent plist body: run the hub entry under this node, with THIS
L43: * process's env minus the birth marker (so the relaunched hub does not
...
L122: try {
L123: execFileSync("launchctl", ["bootstrap", domain, plistPath], { stdio: "ignore" });
```

### 8. Low: Filesystem (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/bin/hub.js -> dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
L14: */
L15: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L16: import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L29: /** Whether this process was born inside our Seatbelt wrap. */
L30: export function sandboxBorn(env = process.env) {
L31: return process.platform === "darwin" && (env[SANDBOX_ACTIVE_ENV] ?? "").trim() !== "";
L32: }
...
L41: /**
L42: * The LaunchAgent plist body: run the hub entry under this node, with THIS
L43: * process's env minus the birth marker (so the relaunched hub does not
...
L122: try {
L123: execFileSync("launchctl", ["bootstrap", domain, plistPath], { stdio: "ignore" });
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/backend/client.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/backend/client.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0
matchedPath = dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/tui.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/tui.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0
matchedPath = dist/tui.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/backend/client.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/backend/client.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0
matchedPath = dist/backend/client.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/backend/sandbox.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/backend/sandbox.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0
matchedPath = dist/backend/sandbox.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/runtime.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/runtime.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0
matchedPath = dist/runtime.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/hub.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/bin/hub.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0
matchedPath = dist/bin/hub.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 20. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta (cleared)
- **Status:** Cleared by review: an automated scan signal, not a confirmed behavior
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.43.4/dist/remote/hub-server.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.37.2
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.37.2
similarity = 0.521
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 3
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 1
- **Development dependencies:** 10
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- @agentclientprotocol/sdk ^1.3.0 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.21.3 (Dependency)
- zcode-acp-martty 0.2.39-zcode.5 (Dependency)
- zod ^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0 (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** zcode-acp-server
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.43.4
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-09-19T04:00:50.999Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-05T14:16:01.032Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-19T02:23:15.921Z
- **Known versions:** 107
- **Latest version:** 0.89.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Agent Client Protocol (ACP) server bridging headless ZCode to editors like Zed and JetBrains.
- **Author:** ZCode ACP Server Contributors
- **Maintainers:** william0wang
- **Keywords:** acp, agent-client-protocol, zed, jetbrains, coding-agent, llm, zcode
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 365
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 2,318,472 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server/v/0.43.4>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/william0wang/zcode-acp>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/william0wang/zcode-acp#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/william0wang/zcode-acp/issues>)
