--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server/v/0.50.0.md" package: "zcode-acp-server" report_status: "published" title: "zcode-acp-server@0.50.0 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "0.50.0" --- # zcode-acp-server@0.50.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 15 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 0.50.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. No malicious attack was identified. The install hook performs a local hub upgrade notification, and sandbox relaunch is conditional on the hub's sandbox marker. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 87.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-07T20:09:20.610Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-07T20:10:06.218Z - **Download time:** 518 ms - **Static scan time:** 1752 ms - **AI review time:** 43336 ms - **Total time:** 45608 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No malicious attack was identified. The install hook performs a local hub upgrade notification, and sandbox relaunch is conditional on the hub's sandbox marker. - **Trigger:** Package installation runs the postinstall notifier; sandbox relaunch occurs when the hub starts with its sandbox marker set. - **Impact:** The inspected behavior supports the package's local hub and sandbox integration; no unrelated data transfer or hostile persistence was established. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-07T20:10:06.218Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The notifier sends a bearer-authenticated POST to 127.0.0.1. The hub writes a temporary LaunchAgent plist and invokes launchctl to restart itself outside the macOS Seatbelt sandbox. - **Rationale:** The flagged persistence behavior is a conditional, package-specific hub relaunch, while the install hook only notifies a token-configured local hub. Inspected runtime and backend probes check available interpreters and SQLite support; no concrete malicious behavior was established. - **Files touched:** package.json, dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js, dist/bin/hub.js, dist/remote/hub-upgrade-notify.js - **Network endpoints:** http://127.0.0.1 ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 87.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** The postinstall hook runs a notifier that sends a bearer-authenticated request only to the local hub address., The hub relaunch behavior is gated on a marker indicating that the hub was started inside the package's macOS sandbox., The backend resolver probes Node for SQLite support; the runtime probe checks Bun's version. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to zcode-acp-server@0.50.0. - Review the evidence and your use of zcode-acp-server@0.50.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node dist/remote/hub-upgrade-notify.js 2>/dev/null || true ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node dist/remote/hub-upgrade-notify.js 2>/dev/null || true ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L14: */ L15: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L16: import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L29: /** Whether this process was born inside our Seatbelt wrap. */ L30: export function sandboxBorn(env = process.env) { L31: return process.platform === "darwin" && (env[SANDBOX_ACTIVE_ENV] ?? "").trim() !== ""; L32: } ... L41: /** L42: * The LaunchAgent plist body: run the hub entry under this node, with THIS L43: * process's env minus the birth marker (so the relaunched hub does not ... L122: try { L123: execFileSync("launchctl", ["bootstrap", domain, plistPath], { stdio: "ignore" }); ``` ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/bin/hub.js -> dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js L14: */ L15: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L16: import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L29: /** Whether this process was born inside our Seatbelt wrap. */ L30: export function sandboxBorn(env = process.env) { L31: return process.platform === "darwin" && (env[SANDBOX_ACTIVE_ENV] ?? "").trim() !== ""; L32: } ... L41: /** L42: * The LaunchAgent plist body: run the hub entry under this node, with THIS L43: * process's env minus the birth marker (so the relaunched hub does not ... L122: try { L123: execFileSync("launchctl", ["bootstrap", domain, plistPath], { stdio: "ignore" }); ``` ### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 11. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/backend/resolve.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 3 ``` ### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0 matchedPath = dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.32.0 matchedPath = dist/runtime.js matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.32.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 3 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 1 - **Development dependencies:** 10 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4 ### Published dependency entries - @agentclientprotocol/sdk ^1.3.0 (Dependency) - ws ^8.21.3 (Dependency) - zcode-acp-martty 0.2.39-zcode.6 (Dependency) - zod ^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** zcode-acp-server - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.50.0 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-09-28T12:09:48.593Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-05T14:16:01.032Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-07T20:12:06.206Z - **Known versions:** 70 - **Latest version:** 0.65.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Agent Client Protocol (ACP) server bridging headless ZCode to editors like Zed and JetBrains. - **Author:** ZCode ACP Server Contributors - **Maintainers:** william0wang - **Keywords:** acp, agent-client-protocol, zed, jetbrains, coding-agent, llm, zcode - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 441 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 3,171,805 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()