---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server/v/0.82.1"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server/v/0.82.1.md"
package: "zcode-acp-server"
report_status: "published"
title: "zcode-acp-server@0.82.1 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.82.1"
---

# zcode-acp-server@0.82.1 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse
- **Selected version:** 0.82.1
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The source intentionally relaunches a sandbox-born hub outside Seatbelt without a separate user confirmation, which is a meaningful isolation bypass even though it is limited to this hub’s startup path. The postinstall hook only sends an authenticated request to the local hub when a token is configured, so it does not show external data theft.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 92.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-05T03:15:37.402Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-05T03:16:43.872Z
- **Download time:** 505 ms
- **Static scan time:** 2352 ms
- **AI review time:** 63611 ms
- **Total time:** 66470 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The hub can automatically move itself outside the macOS Seatbelt sandbox, weakening the isolation of a sandbox-launched agent service.

- **Trigger:** The hub starts on macOS with ZCODE\_ACP\_SANDBOX\_ACTIVE set by a sandboxed backend spawn.

- **Impact:** The hub runs without the Seatbelt restrictions inherited by the original process, reducing containment for remote session handling.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/bin/hub.js, dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-05T03:16:43.872Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** It writes a temporary LaunchAgent plist and uses launchctl to bootstrap and kickstart the hub outside the sandbox.

- **Rationale:** The source intentionally relaunches a sandbox-born hub outside Seatbelt without a separate user confirmation, which is a meaningful isolation bypass even though it is limited to this hub’s startup path. The postinstall hook only sends an authenticated request to the local hub when a token is configured, so it does not show external data theft.

- **Files touched:** ${tmpdir()}/zcode-hub-relaunch-\*/hub.plist, ${tmpdir()}/zcode-hub-relaunch-\*/hub.log, ${tmpdir()}/zcode-hub-relaunch-last

- **Network endpoints:** http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/upgrade

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 92.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The postinstall hook runs an upgrade notifier and suppresses failures., When the hub starts on macOS with the sandbox birth marker, it relaunches itself outside Seatbelt through launchd., The relaunch writes a temporary plist containing an allowlisted environment, including ZCODE\_\* values, with mode 0600., The LaunchAgent sets RunAtLoad and KeepAlive to false and starts the hub once via kickstart., The postinstall notifier returns without a configured token and sends its bearer token only to the local hub at 127.0.0.1.

- **Evidence against:** The relaunch is limited to a hub started with the sandbox marker and is described as supporting visible remote session terminals., The temporary plist is permission-restricted, and the launchd job is not configured to restart on login or process exit., The install hook contacts only the local hub and does nothing when no remote token is configured.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to zcode-acp-server@0.82.1.

- Review the evidence and your use of zcode-acp-server@0.82.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node dist/remote/hub-upgrade-notify.js 2>/dev/null || true
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node dist/remote/hub-upgrade-notify.js 2>/dev/null || true
```

### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 4. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Medium: Install Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js>)

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L14: */
L15: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L16: import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L29: /** Whether this process was born inside our Seatbelt wrap. */
L30: export function sandboxBorn(env = process.env) {
L31: return process.platform === "darwin" && (env[SANDBOX_ACTIVE_ENV] ?? "").trim() !== "";
L32: }
...
L74: /**
L75: * The LaunchAgent plist body: run the hub entry under this node, with an
L76: * ALLOWLISTED copy of this process's env (see relaunchEnv — never the raw
...
L160: try {
L161: execFileSync("launchctl", ["bootstrap", domain, plistPath], { stdio: "ignore" });
```

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/bin/hub.js -> dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
L14: */
L15: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
L16: import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L29: /** Whether this process was born inside our Seatbelt wrap. */
L30: export function sandboxBorn(env = process.env) {
L31: return process.platform === "darwin" && (env[SANDBOX_ACTIVE_ENV] ?? "").trim() !== "";
L32: }
...
L74: /**
L75: * The LaunchAgent plist body: run the hub entry under this node, with an
L76: * ALLOWLISTED copy of this process's env (see relaunchEnv — never the raw
...
L160: try {
L161: execFileSync("launchctl", ["bootstrap", domain, plistPath], { stdio: "ignore" });
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/remote/hub-server.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/remote/hub-server.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/settings/app-update.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/settings/app-update.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/settings/app-update.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/remote/hub-sandbox.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/tui.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/tui.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/tui.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/backend/jsonrpc-child.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/backend/jsonrpc-child.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/backend/jsonrpc-child.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/endpoint.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/remote/endpoint.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/remote/endpoint.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/runtime.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/runtime.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/runtime.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin/hub.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/bin/hub.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/bin/hub.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/i18n.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/i18n.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/i18n.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/remote/login-shell-env.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/remote/login-shell-env.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/remote/login-shell-env.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/utils.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/utils.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/utils.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/handlers/extensions.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/zcode-acp-server@0.82.1/dist/handlers/extensions.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = zcode-acp-server@0.81.0
matchedPath = dist/handlers/extensions.js
matchedIdentity = npm:emNvZGUtYWNwLXNlcnZlcg:0.81.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 3
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 1
- **Development dependencies:** 10
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- @agentclientprotocol/sdk ^1.3.0 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.21.3 (Dependency)
- zcode-acp-martty 0.3.1-zcode.1 (Dependency)
- zod ^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0 (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** zcode-acp-server
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.82.1
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-11-05T02:48:32.722Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-05T14:16:01.032Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-19T02:23:15.921Z
- **Known versions:** 107
- **Latest version:** 0.89.0
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Agent Client Protocol (ACP) server bridging headless ZCode to editors like Zed and JetBrains.
- **Author:** ZCode ACP Server Contributors
- **Maintainers:** william0wang
- **Keywords:** acp, agent-client-protocol, zed, jetbrains, coding-agent, llm, zcode
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 561
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 4,214,202 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/zcode-acp-server/v/0.82.1>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/william0wang/zcode-acp>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/william0wang/zcode-acp#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/william0wang/zcode-acp/issues>)
