npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The lifecycle behavior itself meets the block boundary: postinstall mutates multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, rather than requiring an explicit setup command. No exfiltration wa...

The postinstall behavior directly meets the blocking policy for unconsented mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces. Opt-out flags do not make the default installation consens...

Source confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary even though no exfiltration or fixed remote payload wa...

The source establishes the policy-defined blocking condition: automatic lifecycle mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent configuration surfaces. No separate exfiltration or remote execution...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. No network exfiltration is needed for this c...

Source inspection confirms a concrete unconsented postinstall persistence chain across foreign AI-agent configurations. No exfiltration was found, but the lifecycle control-surface mutati...

The concrete postinstall mutation of a consuming project's root CLAUDE.md meets the foreign/broad AI-agent control-surface blocking policy. No exfiltration was found, but it is not needed...

The source confirms an unconsented install-time write to consumer project agent-control files. This meets the policy's publish-block condition despite the absence of exfiltration or runti...

The package contains a concrete install-time takeover of an existing Hermes control surface, rather than merely an explicit user-invoked setup flow. That meets the blocking policy even th...

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall mutation of consumer AI-agent configuration across several platforms. Under the stated policy, this requires blocking even though no direct...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The absence of observed exfiltration does not mitigate th...

Direct inspection confirms an install-time write to the user's globally discovered OpenCode command directory. This meets the firewall policy for unconsented postinstall mutation of a for...

The postinstall hook establishes persistent, package-authored commands in a user-wide agent configuration location. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented install-time AI-agent co...

This is a concrete, unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, even though the behavior is documented and conditional. No network exfiltration or concealed p...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Collision checks reduce overwrite risk but do not remove the in...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall persistence chain across multiple AI-agent hosts. The global-install default makes it unconsented rather than an explicit user-command se...

The lifecycle hook is unconditional and modifies global agent-discovered instructions outside the package, with forced overwrite. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-hijack block...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, not merely an explicit scaffold command. No separate credential theft or external data-exfiltration path...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad user-level AI-agent control surface; the forced overwrite makes it a block-level lifecycle hijack under policy.

The concrete postinstall chain performs unconsented configuration of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. The opt-out does not make the default install behavior consented.

The package performs the exact prohibited postinstall mutation of a foreign/user-level AI-agent control surface. The absence of observed exfiltration does not mitigate the control-hijack...