npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The package has no observed exfiltration or remote payload chain, but its automatic postinstall globally installs and enables agent extensions. That meets the firewall block boundary for...

The source establishes an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface. No additional exfiltration or remote execution is needed for this policy-defined m...

The postinstall behavior is concrete, unconsented, and targets multiple external AI-agent control surfaces. No network exfiltration or secondary payload was found, but the lifecycle mutat...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including destructive replacement of existing paths. That meets the blocking policy independ...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad shell command control surfaces intended to activate around AI agents. This meets the install-control-surface block...

The install hook establishes persistent, broad command interception specifically for AI-agent contexts. This meets the block boundary for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign/bro...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall execution that mutates AI-assistant configuration according to the installer's own comments. Documentation and opt-out controls do not remove the...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign global AI-agent control surfaces, compounded by package-supplied agent-execution instructions. It meets the firewall block b...

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall persistence in Claude Code's global settings, not merely scanner similarity. Although no external exfiltration was found, this behavior mee...

Source inspection confirms a concrete npm postinstall persistence mechanism that rewrites global Claude Code configuration. This meets the block boundary regardless of the absence of exte...

Source inspection confirms a concrete, unconsented `postinstall` mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets the firewall block boundary regardless of the absence of a conf...

Direct inspection confirms concrete postinstall persistence in a foreign, user-wide AI-agent configuration. Under the install-control-surface policy, this requires a block regardless of t...

This is a concrete, unconsented `postinstall` mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The lack of remote exfiltration does not remove the automatic persistent configuration hijack.

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall mutation of Claude Code configuration and deferred command execution. This meets the firewall block boundary despite no evidence of network...

Source inspection confirms concrete global launcher replacement in a postinstall hook. The absence of visible network code does not mitigate the install-time command hijack.

Source confirms an install-time mutation chain targeting foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the benign product purpose or guarded network code.

The package concretely performs unconsented postinstall mutation of OpenCode configuration and activates plugin paths supplied by a remotely downloaded artifact. This meets the firewall b...

The postinstall behavior concretely injects downloaded plugin code into OpenCode's configuration directory, while the package documentation describes a separate Capix configuration path....

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, coupled to remote payload installation. The absence of direct source-level credential theft does not rem...

Direct source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall chain that persists remote code and writes OpenCode plugin/provider configuration. The same-origin checksum does not establish ind...

The package performs a concrete, unconsented postinstall modification of OpenCode configuration and makes it load plugin paths supplied by a remotely downloaded runtime. The adjacent chec...