npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

This meets the blocking policy because npm postinstall automatically mutates a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. The package’s deferred hook-trust behavior reduces scope but does no...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook performs the concrete chain; this is not merely a static heuristic. Its install-time OpenCode configuration write and unsigned remote runtime...

Source inspection confirms the scanner’s core finding: the package performs global AI-agent configuration and third-party skill installation during npm postinstall. That concrete behavior...

The package is transparent about its behavior, but the behavior is still an unconsented global-install lifecycle mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces. Under the firewall policy, th...

The inspected source confirms the scanner's central claim: a `postinstall` performs automatic global Claude skill and MCP registration. This meets the firewall policy for a block regardle...

The package’s postinstall hook silently writes packaged agent instructions into multiple third-party agent configuration locations. Under the firewall policy, this lifecycle-driven broad...

The package has no confirmed exfiltration chain, but its install hook automatically replaces a globally discovered Claude Code skill. Under the firewall policy, this concrete postinstall...

Direct source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall persistence chain into user-wide Claude control surfaces, not merely scanner similarity. This meets the block boundary for uncon...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time mutation of foreign consumer AI-agent configuration surfaces, not merely scanner hints. This meets the blocking policy despite safeguards...

This is a concrete, unconsented `postinstall` mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The remote binary bootstrap increases impact, even thou...

The install hook performs the policy-defined blocking behavior: unconsented `postinstall` writes to global AI-agent control paths. Lack of network or credential theft does not remove that...

This is a concrete postinstall mutation of a foreign project’s broad AI-agent control surface. The benign design-system purpose and overwrite guard do not remove the unconsented lifecycle...

The concrete postinstall overwrite of consumer `.claude/skills` meets the blocking policy for unconsented mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. No separate exfiltration ch...

The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall path that installs hooks into existing Claude Code/Codex environments. Checksum validation limits tampering of the chosen release asset...

Source inspection confirms a concrete AI-agent permission-bypass configuration combined with remote shell bootstrap and persistent system provisioning. Although this is not npm lifecycle...

Source inspection confirms a concrete npm postinstall chain that deploys package-controlled AI-agent instructions across multiple unrelated agent homes. Under the firewall policy, this is...

The concrete postinstall mutation of global third-party AI-agent skill directories meets the block boundary. No separate exfiltration chain is needed for this verdict.

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall global AI-agent control-surface writes. This meets the firewall block boundary even though no credential exfiltration was found.

Source inspection confirms a concrete unconsented postinstall write to foreign global AI-agent control surfaces. Under the firewall policy, this requires blocking regardless of the absenc...

Source inspection confirms the scanner finding: the install lifecycle writes package-authored AI-agent control artifacts into the consuming project. The preservation of existing files and...

The source establishes an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface and automatic onboarding of third-party code. This meets the firewall block boundary despit...