npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Direct source inspection confirms a postinstall chain that writes broad third-party agent control files and persistent Git hooks in the parent project. This meets the firewall block bound...

The install hook performs an unconsented, externally sourced mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface. This meets the install-control-surface block policy.

The lifecycle behavior is concrete source code, not a scanner inference. It meets the firewall block policy for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface.

The lifecycle hook creates and configures a consumer project's Claude Code control surface automatically. Under the install-control-surface policy, this concrete behavior requires blockin...

The package performs an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets the firewall block boundary even though the separately provided hook workflow is...

This is an unconsented install-time mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, coupled with remote payload download and execution. The restrictive guards do not provide user con...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, not merely an explicit setup command. The forced rules redirect agent behavior to a downlo...

Source inspection confirms the critical behavior directly: postinstall overwrites global Claude/Codex skill entries rather than requiring an explicit setup command. This meets the firewal...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad foreign AI-agent control surface, meeting the blocking policy. The documented manual workflow and opt-out do not make the defa...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. No network or credential-exfiltration chain was found, but i...

Direct inspection confirms a postinstall hook that mutates foreign AI-agent control surfaces, matching the publish-block boundary. Obfuscation and unrelated dependency rewriting increase...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent instruction files, with instructions designed to redirect and constrain agent behavior. Thi...

Source inspection confirms a postinstall hook writes a persistent global Claude Code instruction file. The guards and opt-out do not establish user consent for this broad control-surface...

This is concrete, unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, not an explicit user-command setup. The silent policy injects package-controlled tool preference...

Source inspection confirms the critical behavior directly in the lifecycle hook; scanner similarity labels were not relied upon. This meets the firewall block policy for unconsented posti...

Source inspection confirms an install-time, user-wide Claude Code control-surface mutation, not merely suspicious primitives. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the lack of a co...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign and broad AI-agent control surface, followed by persistent execution over future Claude Code events. That meets the blockin...

Source inspection confirms the concrete install-time Claude Code control-surface mutation required for blocking. The scanner’s credential-exfiltration label is not independently confirmed...

This is a concrete, conditional postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, not merely an explicit user-invoked installer. The hooks cover sensitive agent events and...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle script persistently wires package-controlled code into Claude Code's global configuration and hooks. This meets the firewall block policy for post...

The lifecycle path establishes persistent, user-wide Claude Code execution and instruction control without an explicit setup command. This meets the blocking policy regardless of otherwis...