npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces, not merely an explicit setup command. The source confirms the behavior directly.

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall modification of broad consumer AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary even without separate credential...

The lifecycle code concretely performs automatic setup, and package source documents that setup modifies AI-agent CLIs and creates persistent daemon behavior. This meets the firewall bloc...

This package concretely performs unconsented postinstall writes to multiple global AI-agent instruction surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Package-aligned checksum verification reduce...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes to multiple foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces. Remote binary bootstrap increases impact, despite no direct credential theft...

Source inspection confirms the scanner's core finding: the package performs automatic postinstall writes into the consumer project, including MCP configuration. The absence of an observed...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control files, meeting the firewall block boundary. The user-invoked CLI capabilities do not mitigate the install-t...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall control-surface mutation, not merely scanner similarity. Marker merging and limited CLAUDE safeguards do not remove the default unconsent...

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall chain that modifies foreign project-level AI-agent control files and defaults to all targets. No exfiltration was found, but the control-...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The lack of exfiltration does not mitigate the install-control-surface violation.

Direct source inspection confirms an unconsented `postinstall` writes package-supplied, auto-invocable instructions into foreign global AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking...

This is a policy-defined AI-agent control hijack: normal registry installation modifies foreign project and home AI-agent control surfaces and registers an executable MCP server without r...

Source inspection confirms unconsented install-time mutation of global Codex configuration, instructions, and skills. This meets the blocking boundary even though no separate credential t...

Source confirms a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of consumer-project AI-agent control files. The absence of exfiltration does not remove this foreign broad control-surface hijack.

The install hook automatically initiates persistence and agent-plugin setup rather than requiring an explicit user command. The absent platform binary prevents deeper payload inspection b...

The lifecycle script creates or alters project-level AI-agent instruction files by default, satisfying the concrete install-time control-hijack boundary. Other observed network and CLI ex...

The inspected wrapper establishes an automatic postinstall path into documented daemon and AI-agent plugin setup. The package does not need to harvest credentials for this to warrant bloc...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall modification of a foreign AI SDK OAuth callback page. Although no credential exfiltration or network activity was found in the hook, thi...

The wrapper source establishes an automatic install-time path into documented agent-plugin and persistent-daemon setup. Although the binary is absent and no exfiltration is shown, this me...

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall write to both `~/.claude/skills` and `~/.agents/skills`, which is a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. The unattended global updat...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall write into foreign global AI-agent skill directories. Under the install-control-surface policy, this requires blocking regardless of othe...