npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Static inspection confirms a postinstall hook mutates broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces without requiring an explicit setup command, which matches the firewall block policy. The res...

Static inspection confirms a postinstall external sync command tied to AI-agent hook/control-surface behavior, which meets the policy boundary for blocking unconsented install-time mutati...

The decisive behavior is not ordinary CLI networking; it is unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces. Under the provided policy this should be blocked e...

Static inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of OpenCode global config and AGENTS.md, which meets the firewall block policy for AI-agent control-surface writes. Other risky...

Source inspection confirms install-time mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces through a postinstall hook, which meets the block policy. The scanner finding is substantiated by packa...

This matches the firewall block policy for unconsented npm postinstall mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. The behavior is package-aligned and mostly local, but the inst...

The reviewed JS wrapper has no direct exfiltration or payload obfuscation, but its lifecycle hook automatically triggers documented agent/daemon setup. Under the install control surface p...

Although the package appears aligned with local port/browser coordination and I found no exfiltration, its postinstall performs unconsented mutation of foreign AI-agent MCP control surfac...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control files, which meets the firewall block policy even without exfiltration. Bootstrap/network-heavy set...

The source shows unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent MCP configuration, which matches the block policy even though broader package functionality is aligned with AI-agen...

Source inspection confirms npm postinstall performs broad Codex/Claude agent configuration and service startup without requiring a separate explicit user command in noninteractive install...

Source inspection confirms automatic postinstall writes to OpenCode agent/skill locations, including broad unprefixed skill names, without a separate user setup command. The content is mo...

Source inspection confirms automatic postinstall writes into .claude, which meets the policy threshold for unconsented install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation. The behavior appears...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time mutation of .claude/hooks.json, not merely user-invoked setup or first-party plugin installation. Under the install control surface policy...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes into multiple foreign/broad AI-agent skill directories. Under the firewall policy, that install-time control-surface mutation is...

Source inspection confirms the scanner’s core concern: postinstall mutates broad AI-agent control surfaces across several IDEs without requiring an explicit user command. Under the instal...

Source inspection confirms unconsented npm postinstall mutation of the user's Codex control surface, which the policy treats as blocking even though the functionality is package-aligned a...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a project-level OpenCode skill directory, which matches the firewall block policy for broad AI-agent control-surface writes....

Source inspection confirms automatic postinstall mutation of .opencode/skills, which matches the block policy for unconsented npm lifecycle mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control su...

The concrete malicious behavior is the unconsented postinstall write into broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which the policy says to block. The network and CLI API behavior otherwi...

Source inspection confirms automatic postinstall writes to .cursor hooks.json and an executable hook that injects agent instructions, which meets the firewall policy for blocking unconsen...