npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad user-level AI-agent control surface; the forced overwrite makes it a block-level lifecycle hijack under policy.

The concrete postinstall chain performs unconsented configuration of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. The opt-out does not make the default install behavior consented.

The package performs the exact prohibited postinstall mutation of a foreign/user-level AI-agent control surface. The absence of observed exfiltration does not mitigate the control-hijack...

The concrete postinstall behavior satisfies the block policy regardless of scanner similarity labels. The lifecycle script writes outside the package and forcibly replaces foreign agent-c...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle-driven global OpenCode configuration mutation; the scanner finding is substantiated. Although no exfiltration or remote code loading was found, th...

The lifecycle hook modifies global ~/.claude and ~/.codex control directories without a user command, meeting the blocking policy. The absence of a direct network call in the hook does no...

The package contains no observed exfiltration or remote code-loading chain, but its automatic postinstall installs and activates persistent global OpenCode control files. This meets the b...

The package has no observed exfiltration or remote payload chain, but its automatic postinstall globally installs and enables agent extensions. That meets the firewall block boundary for...

The source establishes an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface. No additional exfiltration or remote execution is needed for this policy-defined m...

The postinstall behavior is concrete, unconsented, and targets multiple external AI-agent control surfaces. No network exfiltration or secondary payload was found, but the lifecycle mutat...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including destructive replacement of existing paths. That meets the blocking policy independ...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad shell command control surfaces intended to activate around AI agents. This meets the install-control-surface block...

The install hook establishes persistent, broad command interception specifically for AI-agent contexts. This meets the block boundary for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign/bro...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall execution that mutates AI-assistant configuration according to the installer's own comments. Documentation and opt-out controls do not remove the...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign global AI-agent control surfaces, compounded by package-supplied agent-execution instructions. It meets the firewall block b...

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall persistence in Claude Code's global settings, not merely scanner similarity. Although no external exfiltration was found, this behavior mee...

Source inspection confirms a concrete npm postinstall persistence mechanism that rewrites global Claude Code configuration. This meets the block boundary regardless of the absence of exte...

Source inspection confirms a concrete, unconsented `postinstall` mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets the firewall block boundary regardless of the absence of a conf...

Direct inspection confirms concrete postinstall persistence in a foreign, user-wide AI-agent configuration. Under the install-control-surface policy, this requires a block regardless of t...

This is a concrete, unconsented `postinstall` mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The lack of remote exfiltration does not remove the automatic persistent configuration hijack.

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall mutation of Claude Code configuration and deferred command execution. This meets the firewall block boundary despite no evidence of network...