npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Source inspection confirms a concrete unconsented postinstall write to foreign global AI-agent control surfaces. Under the firewall policy, this requires blocking regardless of the absenc...

Source inspection confirms the scanner finding: the install lifecycle writes package-authored AI-agent control artifacts into the consuming project. The preservation of existing files and...

The source establishes an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface and automatic onboarding of third-party code. This meets the firewall block boundary despit...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall chain that overwrites multiple consumer-project AI-agent instruction locations and runs a broad sync command. This meets the blocking pol...

Source inspection confirms a concrete npm postinstall control-surface mutation, not merely scanner similarity. This meets the block boundary even though no credential exfiltration or netw...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces. Documentation and an opt-out do not eliminate the automatic lifecycle behavior.

Direct source inspection confirms broad Claude Code installation, execution, shim replacement, and binary/source modification during npm postinstall. This meets the block boundary for unc...

Direct inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of global Claude Code installation files plus runtime network-control injection. This meets the firewall block boundary for for...

This is a concrete unconsented `postinstall` mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, meeting the block boundary. The lack of credential exfiltration does not mitigate the lifecycl...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The benign-looking skill content does not remove the automatic overwrite behavior.

Source inspection confirms a postinstall hook modifies home-level AI-agent instruction directories outside the installed project. This meets the firewall block boundary for unconsented in...

The distributed runtime bundle appears package-aligned, but the install-time script persistently writes AI-agent control instructions into consumer projects without user consent. That con...

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall control-surface mutation targeting consumer-project agent instructions. Lack of exfiltration does not remove the policy-triggering AI-age...

The package contains a concrete automatic postinstall write to consumer AI-agent instruction files. The absence of exfiltration does not remove this policy-defined control-surface attack.

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes to broad AI-agent skill roots. Policy requires blocking this concrete lifecycle control-surface mutation even though no credentia...

Direct source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall writes foreign Claude configuration and instruction files, then injects a mutable `@latest` MCP launcher. This meets the firewal...

Source inspection confirms an install-time mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent configuration files that persists package-controlled session instructions. This meets the blocking policy de...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. Under the stated policy this is concrete malicious behavior regardless of the b...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of a consuming project's AI-agent control files. The behavior meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of credential exfilt...

The source confirms the scanner’s central finding: an automatic npm lifecycle hook modifies broad AI-agent skill roots. Transparency in the README and absence of exfiltration reduce ambig...

Direct inspection confirms an automatic install-time chain that writes package-authored configuration into foreign AI-agent directories. This meets the firewall block boundary regardless...