npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time AI-agent/MCP control-surface writes via package.json postinstall and bin/install.js mappings. There is no confirmed credential exfiltratio...

The payment functionality is plausibly package-aligned, but install-time mutation of AI-agent skill/control files is unconsented and durable. That concrete lifecycle behavior meets the fi...

Source inspection confirms install-time mutation of AI-agent control files, which is not necessary for a CLI library install and persists behavior outside the package. Package-aligned pay...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time writes to .cursor/.claude/.codex/.openclaw instruction surfaces and package.json, which matches the firewall's AI-agent control hijack blo...

Static inspection confirms an install-time write to user-level GoodVibes instruction locations containing mandatory agent directives. That constitutes unconsented lifecycle AI-agent contr...

The source confirms unconsented install-time mutation of AI-agent control files and a background self-update path that reruns that mutation. Even though the payment/network code largely m...

The confirmed postinstall behavior crosses the firewall boundary: it automatically writes package-supplied AI-agent instructions into user-global agent loader directories. That is concret...

Static source inspection confirms install-time writes into AI-agent control directories and project config; this matches the firewall's concrete malicious category for unconsented lifecyc...

Static source inspection confirms lifecycle-time creation of a package-supplied AGENTS.md in the consuming project. Under the firewall policy this is unconsented AI-agent control-surface...

Although the contents look like a legitimate opencode agent bundle and no exfiltration/destructive code was found, installing npm packages must not silently install or activate AI-agent c...

The confirmed issue is not generic network or credential handling; it is install-time mutation of Claude skills and MCP configuration, an AI-agent control surface. Under the firewall boun...

Source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle writes to Claude Code skill directories, which is a concrete AI-agent control-surface mutation even though the content matches the package...

Source inspection confirms a postinstall hook that writes package-controlled Claude skill instructions into the user's AI agent configuration area without an explicit setup command. That...

Although the bundled skills look aligned with the CLI, writing package-controlled AI-agent skills during postinstall is an unconsented lifecycle mutation of agent control files. No exfilt...

Static inspection confirms install-time mutation of Cursor/Claude/Codex agent control files and hook execution surfaces, which is not a normal passive library install behavior. The behavi...

Direct source inspection confirms install-time writes into Claude's skills directory with autonomous agent instructions, which is a concrete AI-agent control-surface mutation outside norm...

The suspicious behavior is not merely a wrapper or package-aligned CLI capability; the lifecycle hook automatically invokes an agent-skill installer during npm install. Under the firewall...

Although many capabilities are package-aligned for an AI workflow CLI, installing AI-agent control files at lifecycle time is an unconsented control-surface mutation. No exfiltration was...

Source inspection confirms install-time writes of AI-agent rule files into the consumer project root. Even though the content is package-aligned and no traditional malware behavior was fo...

Although the package is otherwise transparent and lacks exfiltration or destructive behavior, the global postinstall hook performs an unconsented lifecycle write into Claude Code's skill...

Direct inspection confirms concrete AI-agent control-surface mutation: the installer writes Claude settings that bypass permission checks and expands trusted token-provisioning behavior....