npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The package has substantial benign, user-invoked media/OSINT functionality, but the postinstall script performs a concrete unconsented mutation of an AI-agent dependency config file. That...

Static inspection confirms install-time writes to OpenCode control-surface configs; under the firewall policy this is blocking behavior even though the implementation otherwise appears pa...

The package does not show credential theft, exfiltration, persistence, or destructive behavior, and scanner blob findings are package-aligned skill assets. However, the npm lifecycle hook...

Static inspection confirms concrete runtime mutation of Claude Code permission settings to bypass tool checks and authorize credential provisioning; this is not merely scanner noise or in...

Static inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle AI-agent control-surface mutation via postinstall writes to .claude, matching the firewall block boundary. No credential theft or network...

Source inspection confirms an install-time write into ~/.claude/skills from package-supplied AI-agent instructions, which is concrete unconsented lifecycle control-surface mutation. Other...

Direct source inspection confirms install-time writes to ~/.claude/skills, which is an AI-agent control surface, from a package lifecycle hook. Even without credential theft or exfiltrati...

Static inspection confirms concrete install-time writes of AI-agent instruction files into consumer projects. No exfiltration was found, but this matches the firewall policy for unconsent...

Source inspection confirms automatic runtime writes to Claude Code hook/command configuration plus prompt-control directives, which is an unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation. Ot...

Direct source inspection confirms a concrete AI-agent control-surface mutation that exfiltrates agent transcripts to a hardcoded remote endpoint without clear user-facing disclosure in RE...

The package performs unconsented lifecycle writes to OpenCode agent/control files with shell/edit-capable agents, matching the firewall's malicious AI-agent control hijack boundary. Other...

Source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle mutation of AI-agent control files, which is a concrete firewall block condition independent of whether the wallet features are otherwise...

Static inspection confirms concrete install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation, which matches the firewall block boundary even if the runtime wallet/network code is otherwise package-...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented lifecycle writes into AI-agent control-surface directories from remote content, which meets the firewall blocking criterion for AI-agent cont...

The confirmed lifecycle write to ~/.claude/skills is an unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation, which is blockable even without credential theft or external exfiltration. Other ris...

This is malicious under the firewall boundary because lifecycle install code writes package-supplied AI-agent instructions into a global Claude skills directory. The behavior is not limit...

Static source inspection confirms an install-time lifecycle script writes package-supplied Claude skill instructions into the user's global AI-agent configuration. Under the firewall boun...