npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

This is a concrete automatic postinstall modification of consumer AI-agent control files, including AGENTS.md and newly created .claude files. The safeguards against clobbering do not est...

The automatic postinstall hook mutates Claude Code configuration and injects behavior-bearing instructions into the user's home directory. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented i...

The automatic postinstall performs persistent writes to the user's global Claude Code configuration and injects behavior-bearing instructions. This meets the install-control-surface block...

The automatic postinstall path mutates broad AI-agent configuration and installs executable hooks. This is concrete unconsented install-hook abuse under the stated policy.

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that persists package-controlled skills into both Codex and Claude user directories and prunes their contents. This meets the install...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a consumer AI control surface that enables remote collection of sensitive application data. The code establishes the complete configuration-...

This is a concrete automatic postinstall mutation of a consumer project's AI-agent control surface and related development controls. The Suppa-specific guard and opt-out do not provide ex...

The automatic postinstall performs broad consumer-project and AI-agent control-surface mutation. This meets the install-hook abuse block policy despite the package's scope checks and lack...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface that redirects application imports into a proxy which exfiltrates AI content. The behavior is concrete an...

This package automatically injects a broad Claude Code hook configuration during npm postinstall. The automatic foreign agent-control-surface mutation meets the publish-block policy even...

The automatic postinstall chain mutates a foreign consumer repository's AI-agent control surface and related project controls. This is concrete install-hook abuse despite its Suppa-specif...

The automatic postinstall replaces global Pi agent instructions rather than setting up package-local artifacts, constituting unconsented broad AI-agent control-surface mutation. No creden...

The global-only guard reduces scope but does not obtain explicit consent before postinstall rewrites Claude Code's shared settings and installs persistent hooks. This meets the policy for...

tabwright@4.0.0 uses postinstall to persist package-controlled instructions in ~/.agents/skills. This is an unconsented mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface and meets the publish-...

The automatic global AI-agent configuration mutation establishes a concrete install-time control-hijack path. Platform gating and tarball integrity checking do not remove that unconsented...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that creates enabled MCP configuration and deploys remotely supplied content into a consumer project. Existing-file preservation and...

The automatic postinstall modifies the consumer project's OpenCode configuration and installs enabled npx-based MCP commands. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface abuse bo...

The automatic postinstall performs unconsented global Claude Code installation and persistent user-level configuration changes. This is a concrete install-hook abuse chain affecting a for...

This is concrete AI-agent control hijacking and provider impersonation, not ordinary gateway behavior. The absence of an install lifecycle hook does not remove the runtime attack path.

The package contains a concrete postinstall path that alters several third-party AI-agent skill directories and installs instructions that influence later agent actions. This meets the po...

This is a complete unconsented postinstall chain that mutates a consumer AI import path and transmits intercepted LLM content remotely. The behavior meets the install-hook abuse policy fo...