npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The automatic lifecycle hook mutates broad, foreign AI-agent skill locations and installs instructions that direct agents to operate a trading system. This meets the install-control-surfa...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces. The absence of network or shell execution does not remove the concrete persistence and control-surface risk.

The package has no observed exfiltration or remote payload behavior, but its postinstall hook persistently modifies broad AI-agent skill locations. That concrete lifecycle control-surface...

This is concrete automatic install-time modification of multiple user-wide AI-agent control surfaces, not an explicit user-command setup. The injected instructions create a continuing pat...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The local payload and absence of secret theft do not neutralize the automatic cross-platform agent...

The automatic lifecycle hook broadly mutates consumer AI-agent configuration paths, meeting the install-control-surface blocking policy. No additional exfiltration or network behavior is...

This is concrete postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces. The automatic fan-out, settings change, and agent installation meet the install-hook abuse blocking p...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The absence of observed exfiltration does not remove the concrete control-hijack risk.

The package combines an automatic install hook with persistent edits to multiple user AI-agent instruction files and explicit wallet-tool steering. That is a concrete AI-agent control-hij...

The package has a concrete postinstall hook that persistently modifies foreign AI-agent instruction files to influence later wallet-tool decisions. This meets the install-time AI-agent co...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including a newly created Cursor rules directory. The automatic redirect concerns wallet operati...

The manifest automatically invokes a script that persistently injects behavioral instructions into Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf configuration. This is concrete install-time AI-agent...

The package's automatic postinstall writes a bundled capability into several foreign AI-agent skill roots. Its lack of network or credential handling does not remove the concrete broad co...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that mutates Claude Code configuration and permissions. The guarded behavior and absence of secret theft reduce scope but do not rem...

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall path that writes package-provided content into broad AI-agent discovery directories and Copilot instructions in the consumer project. Thi...

This is concrete install-time mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, followed by instructions that suppress independent judgment and enable package-provided command executi...

The automatic lifecycle hook changes consumer AI-agent configuration and discovery content without explicit user setup. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation block...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent discovery surfaces. The absence of observed exfiltration does not remove the concrete install-time control-hijack risk.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The absence of observed credential exfiltration does not neutralize the persistent contro...

The package has a concrete global post-install path that writes instruction content and executable hooks into multiple foreign AI-agent home directories. This meets the policy threshold f...

The automatic global launcher takeover is concrete, destructive, and targets a broad AI-agent control surface. The global-install guard does not establish consent to replace any pre-exist...