npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The package has concrete postinstall code that writes its bundled instructions into several unrelated AI-agent skill directories. Safety-oriented skill content does not remove the unconse...

This package performs a concrete, unconsented global-install mutation of foreign AI-agent skill paths and overwrites existing directories. The global-only guard does not remove the instal...

The package persistently deploys and injects instructions designed to defeat agent safety boundaries, then supplies command execution capability. No install hook or external exfiltration...

Direct source inspection confirms a postinstall-triggered executable installs Codex and Claude Code hooks. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented lifecycle mutation of foreign/bro...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the block boundary. The user-configured Payload REST client does not mitigate the...

The install-time mutation of a user-wide foreign AI-agent configuration and registration of executable hooks is a concrete policy-blocking chain. No exfiltration was found, but it is not...

The package’s postinstall performs an unconsented global AI-agent skills installation, meeting the install-control-surface blocking boundary. No additional exfiltration is required for th...

The source confirms a concrete postinstall chain that mutates global Codex trust and hook settings based solely on pre-existing state. This meets the install-control-surface block boundar...

Source establishes an automatic postinstall path that invokes an opaque native hook installer, and the package documents that it installs hooks for two external agent products. This meets...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including reviewer-suppression rules. No exfiltration is needed for this concrete control-hijack beha...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of the consuming project's Claude Code configuration and installs unrelated third-party agent plugins. This meets the firewall block...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that writes to the consumer’s .claude/skills directory and force-overwrites an agent skill. That meets the blocking policy for uncon...

This is a concrete install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, including forced replacement of an existing skill. No additional exfiltration chain is needed for the block...

The postinstall hook performs unconsented destructive replacement in a foreign project-level AI-agent skill directory. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface block criterion...

This is a concrete, unconsented global postinstall mutation of broad Claude and Codex command/configuration control surfaces. The lifecycle guard does not remove the risk for ordinary glo...

The source confirms an unconsented postinstall writes executable plugin content to a foreign user configuration and arranges background execution. No network exfiltration was found, but i...

The package’s install hook directly performs configuration and hook injection into detected third-party agent environments, rather than requiring an explicit user command. This meets the...

Source confirms an automatic postinstall chain that persists package-controlled configuration and lifecycle behavior in global Claude and Codex locations. This meets the blocking policy r...

Source inspection confirms the scanner’s critical finding: postinstall mutates external Claude agent configuration and installs skills, with a moving npx@latest command. This meets the in...

The postinstall performs concrete global Claude/Codex control-surface mutation, including destructive replacement of existing agents and lifecycle-hook registration. This meets the instal...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces, including permissive Claude settings, hooks, and remote MCP configuration. The lifecycle behavior meets the...