npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The package’s install hook performs unprompted remote-code installation and alters the broad, foreign Codex agent surface. This meets the blocking policy despite vendor-aligned endpoints....

This is an unconsented postinstall chain that executes an opaque downloaded binary to alter Codex and Claude Code hook surfaces. It meets the blocking boundary for foreign AI-agent contro...

The package’s postinstall creates or updates a Claude Code skill outside its own installation directory and explicitly states it activates in future conversations. The guard and opt-out d...

Source inspection confirms a postinstall hook that overwrites a pre-existing global Codex launcher, rather than relying on package-manager-owned bin linking. That creates a concrete broad...

The package performs unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent command control surface, including deletion of any existing launcher. No exfiltration is needed for this concret...

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall chain that installs a foreign global AI-agent CLI and mutates persistent execution surfaces. This meets the install-time foreign AI-age...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking lifecycle-control-surface policy even though no exfiltration end...

The postinstall hook performs unconsented mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces, including ~/.codex and ~/.claude. Disclosure in the README does not change that install-...

The global-install guard limits scope but does not make these postinstall changes user-consented. The package automatically modifies external AI-agent configuration and routing surfaces.

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall chain that automatically configures multiple foreign AI-agent environments on global install. This meets the supplied blocking boundary d...

The package’s postinstall hook performs remote third-party AI-skill installation through a shell command. This satisfies the policy’s concrete unconsented install-time foreign AI-agent co...

Source confirms concrete npm postinstall mutation of the consuming project’s multi-vendor AI-agent configuration surface. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of confi...

Source confirms concrete install-time global installation of a foreign AI-agent CLI plus persistent user-environment mutation. This meets the block boundary even though no credential exfi...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the block boundary. No remote exfiltration is needed for this verdict.

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall write path into global, multi-vendor AI-agent skill directories. Safeguards against overwriting conflicts do not remove that control-surface mut...

Source confirms the critical behavior directly; the workspace and CI guards do not mitigate automatic mutation on ordinary global installation.

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall writes both a project-root file and a package-controlled AI-agent skill outside the package. This is concrete, unconsented install-time...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad foreign AI-agent control surface. Local-only copying and an opt-out do not remove the default install-time impact.

Concrete postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces meets the block policy. The absence of observed external exfiltration does not remove the unconsented persistence...

The lifecycle hook performs unconsented, broad consumer-project AI-agent and hook configuration. This meets the firewall's install-time AI-agent control-surface block boundary despite col...

Direct source inspection confirms an install-time write to global Claude Code hooks, not merely a scanner signature. The PATH guard limits exposure but does not make the unconsented broad...