npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

Source inspection confirms the policy-blocking behavior directly in the lifecycle script. CI and opt-out guards do not make the default install-time Claude Code mutation consensual.

The shipped content shows no exfiltration or remote payload behavior, but the automatic lifecycle hook performs concrete, unconsented writes to broad third-party AI-agent instruction surf...

The source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. No separate exfiltration or payload execution was found, but the install-time control-...

This meets the blocking policy: an npm postinstall mutates broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces without an explicit user setup command. The remote executable delivery chain materially...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a shared, foreign AI-agent credential/control surface, coupled with silent account provisioning and credential replacement. The behavi...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. Package-aligned downloading does not mitigate the control-hijack behavior.

The behavior is concrete and automatically triggered by npm postinstall, not merely an explicit setup command. It persists a downloaded MCP capability across multiple foreign AI clients.

Direct source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall path that mutates multiple third-party AI-agent configuration and hook files. This meets the blocking boundary for broad forei...

The package contains no confirmed exfiltration or remote payload chain, but its automatic global omp-agent prompt/config mutation meets the install-time AI-agent control-hijack block boun...

The source confirms an automatic postinstall write to multiple foreign global AI-agent control surfaces. Under the stated policy, that concrete unconsented install-time mutation requires...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The lack of observed exfiltration does not mitigate the install-time configuration hijack.

The behavior is concrete and automatic at postinstall, not merely a user-invoked setup path. Although no data theft was found, the package mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface durin...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Absence of exfiltration does not mitigate that install-time cont...

The package has a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. Its video-editing runtime behavior appears feature-aligned, but does not mitigate that...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces. Local-only binding and release integrity checks do not mitigate the control-surface ta...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall writes to broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the package’s stated automation...

The lifecycle path is concrete and reaches global Claude configuration and recurring command hooks. This meets the blocking policy regardless of scanner similarity labels.

Source inspection confirms the scanner’s core finding: a postinstall hook writes root-level AI-agent instruction files in the consuming project. The non-overwrite guard and absence of exf...

The postinstall behavior is concrete, automatic, and targets multiple foreign global agent configurations. This meets the blocking policy even though the package uses package-branded asse...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The global-install and existing-Cursor guards reduce scope but do not make the mutati...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, combined with persistence and a preconfigured remote capture endpoint. The consent gate limi...