npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The postinstall lifecycle script performs a concrete, unconsented mutation of Claude Code's global hook configuration. The binary-presence guard limits activation but does not make the in...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad Claude Code control surface. No install-time exfiltration was found, but the lifecycle behavior meets the block boundary.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, coupled with remote executable installation and persistence. The guards do not establish...

This is a concrete postinstall chain from remote retrieval to mutation of broad project AI-agent control surfaces. The key guard limits reach but does not make the install-time mutation u...

The behavior is source-confirmed and install-triggered, not merely an explicit setup command. API-key and workspace prerequisites reduce reachability but do not remove the concrete broad...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign project and its AI-agent configuration. Although the content is package-aligned and no exfiltration was found, the install...

Direct source inspection confirms the scanner's critical finding. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface.

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented install-time mutation of broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary even though the hook does not itself...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. Lack of observed network exfiltration does not remove the in...

Source confirms the scanner finding: the lifecycle hook changes multiple user-level AI-agent skill roots rather than requiring an explicit setup command. This meets the firewall block pol...

The concrete postinstall behavior is unconsented mutation of foreign global AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary despite the package-aligned generated content.

Direct inspection confirms the lifecycle payload performs the control-surface writes; README disclosure does not make the npm postinstall consensual. No separate exfiltration chain was fo...

The package implements a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation chain across third-party AI-agent configurations. Its normal provider networking is secondary and user-configured.

The install hook performs a concrete, unconsented global mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent skill surfaces. No separate credential theft or unrelated network exfiltration was found, but t...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, meeting the block policy. The absence of install-time exfiltration does not remove the launcher-h...

The postinstall path unconditionally mutates global Claude Code configuration and establishes package-controlled execution across unrelated sessions. This meets the install-control-surfac...

The package contains concrete, automatic broad AI-agent control-surface mutation and stealthy monitoring/persistence activated by ordinary CLI use. No lifecycle hook is needed for this be...

The postinstall hook concretely mutates a broad AI-agent control surface by installing remote skills. Opt-out and source-checkout guards do not make this install-time action consented.

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface via externally fetched code. This meets the install-control-surface blocking boundary.

The install hook concretely mutates foreign AI-agent control surfaces without consent and executes an integrity-unverified remote binary. The global-install guard and opt-outs do not remo...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the loopback endpoint.