npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The lifecycle hook performs default-approved writes to a foreign project’s Claude Code files. The absence of exfiltration does not remove the policy-defined install-time agent-control hij...

The lifecycle hook automatically installs package-controlled agent instructions into multiple global AI-client control surfaces. That concrete install-time mutation meets the blocking pol...

The package concretely performs unconsented postinstall mutation of consumer AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md and build scripts. This meets the blocking policy for foreign/broad AI-agent control-surfa...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The benign-looking statusline purpose does not remove the persistent global command injection.

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad foreign AI-agent control surface. The observed lifecycle behavior meets the firewall block boundary even without confirmed da...

The install hook implements concrete, unconsented mutation of broad foreign AI-agent skill locations. Absence of exfiltration does not remove that install-time control-surface risk.

The install-time mutation of Claude Desktop configuration is concrete and unconsented. This meets the blocking policy even though the runtime editor functionality appears package-aligned.

The confirmed install-time Claude Desktop configuration mutation meets the block policy for a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. Other shell and network features are runtime video-ed...

Source inspection confirms a postinstall hook that mutates a broad set of foreign AI-agent configuration files. This meets the install-control-surface block criterion regardless of the op...

Direct source inspection confirms a concrete, automatic postinstall AI-agent control-surface takeover. The absence of exfiltration does not mitigate the unconsented cross-tool persistence.

The lifecycle source establishes an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy despite no observed network exfiltration.

The postinstall hook performs unconsented mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the package's stated browser-automation purpose.

The concrete postinstall fan-out writes behavior-bearing assets into foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces without explicit user invocation. This meets the install-control-surface block...

Source confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent configuration surfaces. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy despite no confirmed network exfi...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy regardless of the ab...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The global-install guard reduces scope but does not provide consent for the configuration...

Source directly establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. The package-aligned download and local credential ha...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook silently performs broad cross-agent configuration and instruction injection. This meets the publish-block policy regardless of the absence of...

The lifecycle behavior meets the block boundary: postinstall automatically mutates persistent Claude Code and other AI-tool control/configuration surfaces. Opt-in harvest networking does...

The lifecycle hook directly performs broad foreign AI-agent registration and instruction-file mutation without an explicit user command. This meets the install-control-surface block crite...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, coupled to baked remote egress and transcript collection. Consent governs capture only after the...