npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The lifecycle hook performs concrete, persistent AI-agent instruction-file mutation outside the package directory. Absence of exfiltration does not remove this install-time control-surfac...

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall takeover of a consumer repository’s CLAUDE.md and persistence-oriented ignore-file mutation. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented...

The install-time global Claude Code configuration write meets the blocking policy regardless of the statusline's presently benign behavior. No credential exfiltration was found in the ins...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of both Claude and Codex user MCP configurations. This meets the firewall block policy regardless of the package's stated or...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent skill locations and package-controlled instructions that act on injected work. This meets the...

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall write into pre-existing third-party AI-agent skill directories. Under the install-control-surface policy, this is a concrete blocking c...

Source confirms a concrete, automatic chain from the package’s default installer flow to foreign agent-config rewrites, credential/proxy provisioning, and persistence. The lack of an npm...

Source inspection confirms a concrete postinstall write to consumer CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md, which is a foreign AI-agent control surface. The absence of exfiltration does not mitigate this po...

The lifecycle code establishes an unconsented, cross-project AI-agent control path at install time. This meets the firewall block condition even though no install-time exfiltration was ob...

Source inspection confirms an unguarded postinstall mutation of foreign/broad agent skill locations. The lifecycle condition contradicts the script's global-install-only claim.

Direct source inspection confirms automatic postinstall global agent configuration and hook injection. This meets the firewall block policy even though no exfiltration endpoint was found.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The inspected lifecycle code also permits remote instructi...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including destructive replacement of existing paths. It meets the blocking policy regardle...

The package performs concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple broad AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block policy even though no install-time exfiltration...

This is an unconsented install-time mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the firewall block policy despite no confirmed data exfiltration.

The automatic postinstall crosses multiple unrelated AI-host configuration domains and persists package-controlled agent behavior. This meets the install-control-surface block boundary ev...

This is a concrete unconsented install-time mutation of foreign global AI-agent configuration, not merely a user-invoked CLI feature. No separate credential-exfiltration chain was confirmed.

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces. The absence of lifecycle exfiltration does not neutralize the persistence and permission...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. Lack of observed lifecycle exfiltration does not remove the...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, plus persistence and interception setup. This meets the blocking policy despite s...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, not merely a user-invoked integration. The source establishes transcript access through that ins...