npm malware reports, with evidence.

The automatic lifecycle hook makes broad, persistent changes to foreign AI-agent control surfaces and installs an additional global package. This meets the install-hook abuse boundary reg...

This is concealed, remote-controlled use of an authenticated WhatsApp session to alter subscriptions without a caller request. No install hook is present, but the runtime behavior is conc...

This is concrete, unconsented install-time remote code execution with persistence, obscured by character-code decoding. The benign-looking command wrapper does not justify the installer b...

This is a concrete, remotely controlled and unconsented account-mutation behavior in a WhatsApp library. The benign Node-version preinstall check does not mitigate the runtime abuse.

This is an automatic postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The global-only guard and opt-out do not make the install action consensual.

The package has a postinstall hook that automatically fan-outs package-controlled AI-agent content across global directories and changes a global Claude Code preference. This is concrete...

This is an automatic postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces, including global skills, agents, and Claude settings. The behavior meets the install-hook abuse b...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, combined with shell permissions and automatic installation of future releases. The behavior is concrete...

The package contains explicit AI-behavior steering that suppresses independent source verification, alongside host fingerprinting and error telemetry to a remote endpoint. These are concr...

This is an automatic install-time remote native-code delivery path with certificate validation disabled and no payload integrity check. It creates a concrete supply-chain execution risk i...

The automatic postinstall remote-code execution is a concrete supply-chain attack surface, not a user-invoked feature. Its mutable unverified payload warrants blocking publication.

Source inspection confirms automatic install-time persistence, elevated execution, hidden daemon restart, and silent system-package installation. These are concrete install-hook abuse beh...

The automatic, obfuscated postinstall chain launches a remote global AI-agent skill installer and targets foreign agent-control locations. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking bound...

This package contains concrete, unconsented mutations of a user's WhatsApp subscriptions and message content, plus a reachable shell-injection flaw. These behaviors are unrelated to ordin...

The confirmed install-time mutation of consumer files and existing AI-agent configuration is a concrete unconsented control-surface change. No exfiltration was needed to establish the ins...

This is unconsented install-time mutation of a consumer project and its future lifecycle behavior, with detached reconciliation to continue the chain. The CI guard and reduced mode do not...

This is deliberate, concealed, user-unconsented account manipulation on the normal runtime path. The harmless version-check install hook does not mitigate the runtime behavior.

Automatic system-package installation and browser/system-dependency installation are materially broader than ordinary package setup and execute before the user runs the package. The lifec...

The lifecycle hook makes broad AI-agent configuration changes and user-level dependency installation automatically. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy even though no direct...

The package combines an automatic lifecycle hook, a self-dependency selecting another release, broad consumer-project mutation, user-wide AI-agent changes, and detached persistence of the...

This is a concrete, unconsented install-hook abuse chain that broadly mutates and persistently controls consumer project files. No self-dependency or install-time exfiltration was found,...