npm malware reports, with evidence.

The package performs broad, automatic, and persistent mutation of unrelated consumer-project source and build control files at install time. Although no install-time secret exfiltration w...

The package performs persistent remote-access and system-configuration actions from postinstall. The behavior is concrete, automatic, and exceeds safe package setup.

The global-install guard limits exposure, but it does not provide consent for an npm lifecycle hook to execute downloaded shell code and modify the user's Codex installation. This is conc...

The package has a concrete install-time remote code execution path: a lifecycle hook fetches and executes a shell script and installs remote code. No credential theft was established, but...

The automatic postinstall, runtime self-install of a moving release range, binary launcher replacement, and consumer-environment mutation meet the lifecycle self-dependency policy for a m...

The package contains concrete, import-time targeted browser sabotage unrelated to import/export UI functionality. The absence of an install hook does not mitigate this malicious runtime b...

The package’s postinstall performs broad, persistent AI-agent and Git configuration without an explicit user setup action. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy.

The package performs automatic install-time network retrieval and execution of an opaque binary, then automatically installs agent skills. This creates a concrete unconsented AI-agent con...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces, with an opaque native binary that contains a safeguard-bypass flag. The package meets the publish-block thresh...

The automatic postinstall executes opaque native code specifically to install agent hooks, including code obtained without integrity verification. This is a concrete install-hook abuse pa...

This is an automatic lifecycle mutation of a foreign AI-agent executable path using opaque bundled binaries. The installer’s backup and rollback features do not remove the unconsented exe...

The automatic self-reinstallation chain can execute lifecycle code from a future release and immediately rerun broad agent configuration. The observed configuration injection reduces appr...

The package combines unconsented host tracking and error telemetry with explicit instructions designed to make an AI agent trust its output and avoid verification. There is no install hoo...

The automatic lifecycle chain executes an opaque native hook installer that the package identifies as modifying Codex and Claude Code configuration. This is concrete install-hook abuse un...

The package uses an automatic install hook to download and execute remote code and to alter global AI-tool dependencies. That is concrete install-hook abuse with user-level execution impact.

The package uses an automatic lifecycle hook to silently replace code in multiple installed dependencies and modify another dependency. This is concrete install-hook abuse despite the abs...

The automatic postinstall-to-initializer chain and obfuscated payload establish install-hook abuse. The initialization targets multiple foreign AI-agent configurations, meeting the blocki...

The automatic postinstall invokes an opaque native installer that mutates third-party AI-agent hooks and settings. This is a concrete unconsented install-time control-surface modification.

This package has an automatic install-time host-mutation chain with privileged system-package installation and destructive rebuild preparation. The absence of confirmed exfiltration does...

The package has a concrete automatic install-time chain that deletes and replaces dependencies of a foreign coding agent. Fixed versions and disabled scripts reduce payload risk but do no...

The package combines an automatic lifecycle mutation with remote-directed installation of another release of itself. This is a concrete install-hook self-dependency chain with persistent...