npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The automatic global updater, enabled lifecycle scripts, and runtime self-dependency form a concrete unconsented supply-chain execution path. The narrow permission-repair hook does not of...

The package combines an automatic install hook with persistent global AI-agent instruction injection and coercive tool-use rules. This is concrete install-hook abuse, not an explicit user...

The package combines automatic lifecycle execution, host telemetry, remote executable installation, privilege-invoking system changes, and reviewer manipulation. These behaviors establish...

This is a concrete automatic lifecycle chain that modifies and redirects a foreign AI-agent CLI. The observed behavior meets the install-hook abuse block boundary even without proof of se...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces plus background home-directory repository indexing. The lifecycle-triggered persistence chain meets th...

This is unconsented install-time internal-service probing and external disclosure of returned data. The automatic lifecycle hook makes the behavior concrete and harmful.

The lifecycle hook performs automatic broad mutation of the consumer's .claude control surface. Its guards and lack of network behavior reduce scope but do not establish user consent for...

This is concrete, unconsented use of an authenticated third-party account combined with concealed targeting and host telemetry. The install hook itself is limited, but the runtime behavio...

This package contains a silent, automatic install-time telemetry beacon that inspects consumer project metadata and transmits it to a third party without an explicit user command. The ven...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall persistence mechanism that mutates broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. Its injected instructions steer agents toward wallet and pass...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface. The conditional Muse check does not remove the automatic forced global installation behavior when th...

The automatic lifecycle hook makes broad, persistent changes to foreign AI-agent control surfaces and installs an additional global package. This meets the install-hook abuse boundary reg...

The install lifecycle automatically installs a foreign AI-agent CLI and persists broad user-environment changes. This is concrete unconsented install-hook abuse under the stated policy.

This is concealed, remote-controlled use of an authenticated WhatsApp session to alter subscriptions without a caller request. No install hook is present, but the runtime behavior is conc...

This is concrete, unconsented install-time remote code execution with persistence, obscured by character-code decoding. The benign-looking command wrapper does not justify the installer b...

This is concrete, unconsented install-time data exfiltration through DNS and HTTP. Its lifecycle trigger makes the behavior supply-chain malware rather than a harmless library feature.

An automatic lifecycle hook and import path exfiltrate the local hostname to an unrelated webhook. The package description's claim of benign testing does not establish consent or negate t...

This is concrete, silent runtime exfiltration of email-related data to a non-service endpoint. The limited postinstall hook does not reduce the confirmed runtime attack.

This is an intentionally obscured browser denial-of-service payload that alters and locks a host page when deployed. The absence of installation hooks limits the trigger but does not neut...

This is a concrete, remotely controlled and unconsented account-mutation behavior in a WhatsApp library. The benign Node-version preinstall check does not mitigate the runtime abuse.

The package performs concrete, automatic collection and external transmission during preinstall. Its research-oriented claims do not establish consent for exfiltration in downstream insta...