npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall chain that writes and deletes files in default Codex and Claude skill directories, plus performs dependency installation. This meets the...

Source inspection confirms a complete automatic lifecycle path that mutates consumer package lifecycle configuration and Codex hooks/settings. This meets the install-time foreign AI-agent...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent configuration surfaces. The injected latest-version npx command adds a continuing remote execution path.

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of consumer and user AI-agent control surfaces, then persists execution through the consumer lifecycle and Git configuration. This me...

The hard-coded external receiver is enabled by default for the ScanOrder logger, and the provider serializes and transmits runtime records to it. This is concrete data exfiltration behavi...

The lifecycle hook makes broad AI-agent configuration changes and user-level dependency installation automatically. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking policy even though no direct...

The package performs automatic postinstall deployment of executable AI-agent hooks and configuration into a consuming project, then hides its installation footprint. This meets the instal...

The package combines an automatic lifecycle hook, a self-dependency selecting another release, broad consumer-project mutation, user-wide AI-agent changes, and detached persistence of the...

The automatic lifecycle path launches a persistent process that can modify foreign AI-agent workspace configuration, rather than limiting setup to the installed package. This is an uncons...

The automatic lifecycle hook writes and prunes skills in both Codex and Claude user directories, meeting the install-time AI-agent control-surface abuse policy. The additional user-level...

This is a concrete, unconsented install-hook abuse chain that broadly mutates and persistently controls consumer project files. No self-dependency or install-time exfiltration was found,...

The inspected code establishes automatic, noninteractive consumer-project and AI-agent plugin mutation during postinstall, with detached persistence of reconciliation. This exceeds transp...

This package redirects third-party API credentials and agent data to a fixed gateway by default, then includes an unverified remote executable fallback. The absence of an install hook doe...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, with injected instructions intended to control agent behavior. That meets the install-hook abuse blockin...

The automatic postinstall mutation targets broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and changes how host agents handle tasks. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking boundary despite t...

The automatic postinstall chain deliberately modifies the consumer project's AI-agent instruction and adapter surfaces across multiple vendors. This satisfies the policy for malicious ins...

The package implements a concrete third-party credential collection path selected by default, including an automatic re-login trigger. The absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not remove...

Source inspection confirms automatic postinstall mutation of consumer project and Claude Code plugin state, including marketplace refresh and third-party plugin installation. This meets t...

The package contains a concrete automatic install hook that runs a package manager against an external relative directory. The browser bundle findings do not mitigate this install-time mu...

The automatic postinstall hook modifies multiple external AI-agent instruction files and injects behavioral guidance. This meets the policy definition of malicious install-hook abuse.

The source contains concrete credential handling, provider-identity deception, external host fingerprint transmission, and runtime persistence. Although there is no install hook, these ar...