npm detections from LPM Firewall.

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of global AI-agent control surfaces, including destructive pruning of prior content. The behavior meets the install-hook abuse blocking boundar...

The automatic lifecycle hook modifies both Codex and Claude user-level skill surfaces and prunes their contents. That concrete behavior meets the install-control-surface blocking policy e...

The postinstall hook persistently writes package-authored instructions into shared Codex and Claude directories. That concrete cross-agent control-surface mutation warrants blocking even...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, user-level AI-agent control surfaces. The lack of network activity does not remove the persistence and control-surface risk.

The automatic postinstall hook persistently injects and synchronizes package-controlled instructions in both Codex and Claude user directories. This satisfies the install-control-surface...

The postinstall hook silently mutates two foreign, user-wide AI-agent control surfaces and synchronizes their contents. This meets the install-control-surface block policy even though no...

The package contains a default runtime path that transmits account data, including a serialized configuration that may contain IMAP passwords, to an unrelated external host. The absence o...

The source directly combines secret-bearing account logging with an automatic remote request to an unrelated host. The limited workspace-link postinstall hook does not mitigate this runti...

The package uses an automatic lifecycle hook to execute remote code and install an AI-agent plugin outside the package itself. The global-only guard does not establish user consent for th...

The package automatically changes a consumer project's lifecycle configuration and installs AI-agent plugins during dependency installation. These are concrete, broad control-surface muta...

The browser payload intentionally blocks a host page's controls behind an encoded overlay, which is concrete malicious behavior. Lack of a normal manifest entry limits automatic activatio...

This is malicious because an automatic lifecycle hook alters global Claude Code telemetry settings to export sensitive AI-session content. The opt-out does not establish prior consent.

The automatic postinstall changes both consumer-project and home-directory AI-agent configuration, including enabled MCP commands and a pre-tool hook. This meets the install-hook abuse bo...

The source directly sends serialized IMAP configuration, including a possible password field, to an external logging endpoint during normal runtime initialization. This is concrete creden...

The automatic postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces is a concrete malicious install-hook abuse under the policy. The absence of visible credential theft does no...

This package uses an automatic npm lifecycle hook to modify a global AI-agent configuration rather than requiring an explicit user setup action. The registered server can then execute rep...

This package has a concrete, unconsented postinstall chain that mutates broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces and a user dependency environment. The behavior meets the install-hook...

The automatic postinstall mutation of a foreign Codex SDK is a concrete install-time AI-agent control-surface change. Static inspection found no secret theft or network activity in that l...

The automatic global lifecycle hook broadly mutates AI command resolution and establishes scheduled self-updating persistence. This satisfies the install-hook abuse policy even though no...

The package automatically injects persistent Claude Code hooks during installation, rather than limiting that agent integration to an explicit user command. This meets the install-time fo...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of the consumer project's Claude skill configuration. The absence of network or secret theft does not neutralize the automatic agent-control ta...