npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The lifecycle hook performs broad, persistent Claude/Codex interception and scheduled execution on global install. Under the firewall policy, this concrete unconsented postinstall control...

This is concrete credential exfiltration from foreign agent configuration to a package-controlled endpoint before consent, not merely an explicit configuration helper.

This is an unconsented postinstall remote-code loader disguised as an install check. The packaged library itself is benign math, but its lifecycle hook creates a concrete execution chain.

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad host AI-agent control surfaces, including third-party plugin installation. No exfiltration was found, but the install-time contr...

The package silently sends mail-account configuration to an unrelated endpoint during ordinary initialization. No lifecycle hook was found, but the concrete runtime exfiltration warrants...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of project and user-wide AI-agent control surfaces. It meets the firewall block policy despite no observed exfiltration or remote payloa...

The lifecycle script concretely modifies global Claude Code and Codex skill roots on installation, meeting the firewall block condition. The later hook trust flow does not negate the earl...

The install-time hook performs unconsented mutation of a foreign global agent/terminal extension surface and installs code configured for detached startup. This meets the blocking policy...

The source establishes a concrete install-time foreign AI-agent control-surface write and startup persistence chain. Lack of outbound traffic in the inspected plugin does not negate the p...

The inspected postinstall behavior concretely mutates foreign host AI-agent configuration and installs plugins automatically. This exceeds a first-party, user-invoked setup flow.

This is a concrete npm-postinstall mutation of a foreign, user-global AI-agent control surface. Conditional harness selection and tagged merging reduce scope but do not make the lifecycle...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the block policy. Obfuscation and additional dependency rewriting raise confidence; no exfiltration...

Direct lifecycle source confirms broad, persistent AI-agent configuration writes at install time. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of observed exfiltration.

This is a remote-code bootstrap executed automatically at install time, with trust rooted solely in a remotely served manifest. It creates a concrete install-time arbitrary-code-execution...

The concrete postinstall mutation of global Claude Code configuration is sufficient for a block under the install-control-surface policy. The reviewed statusline source does not show netw...

The package performs behavior-bearing cross-agent configuration writes during postinstall without an explicit user command. This meets the install-control-surface blocking boundary despit...

No install hook is present, but the shipped runtime is a concealed, automatically activated web proxy with service-worker persistence rather than an SVG library. That concrete behavior wa...

The automatic lifecycle path performs broad AI-agent configuration writes in the consuming project without an explicit user command. That meets the install-control-surface block criterion...

Direct source inspection confirms a cookie-forwarding service-worker proxy bundled under an unrelated SVG package name. The absence of install hooks limits install-time impact but does no...

This is concrete install-time credential and data exfiltration with stealth/anti-analysis behavior, not package-aligned functionality. The package should be blocked.