npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The automatic lifecycle hook executes an opaque downloaded or bundled binary specifically to alter Codex and Claude Code integration. This is a concrete install-time AI-agent control-surf...

The active import-time server and concealed remote credentialed client are incompatible with the minimal package identity and create concrete unconsented forwarding of user input. The lac...

The import-time daemon and remote Function execution form an active remote-code-execution path. The cryptographic check authenticates the operator payload rather than constraining its cap...

An npm post-install hook automatically executes opaque native code to install AI-agent hooks. This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface.

The only entry point implements an obfuscated, remotely controlled redirect chain whose target is encrypted until runtime. That concealed active behavior is malicious.

The automatic post-install mutation of Claude Code hooks is an unconsented modification of a broad AI-agent control surface. This meets the install-control-surface block policy.

The package establishes an automatic lifecycle chain from npm installation to an opaque binary's agent-hook installer. This is concrete install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation and...

The automatic lifecycle hook performs unconsented installation and configuration of a broad DSH AI-agent control surface. This meets the install-control-surface blocking boundary even wit...

The automatic post-install hook writes to a consumer-owned AI-agent control file, meeting the policy threshold for unconsented lifecycle mutation of a foreign control surface. No addition...

The package has no install lifecycle hook, but its normal runtime automatically exports host and usage telemetry to an external default recipient and accepts server-directed endpoint chan...

The active, obfuscated remote redirect chain and forwarding of visitor query parameters establish a concrete malicious browser payload. The code provides no source-visible destination all...

The package contains a concrete postinstall path that force-registers an agent skill in the user's global Muse scope. This is unconsented lifecycle mutation of a broad AI-agent control su...

This is concrete install-hook abuse: an automatic npm lifecycle hook changes multiple unrelated AI-agent configurations and installs a session-controlling plugin. The conditional director...

The automatic hook modifies foreign AI-agent rule directories and deletes existing configuration, which meets the install-control-surface blocking policy. Its automatic remote native-bina...

The package has a concrete automatic install-time path that mutates multiple external AI-agent instruction surfaces. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented post-install control-su...

The package performs unconsented post-install mutation of multiple consumer AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy for lifecycle-based control-surface modification.

The package performs substantial automatic system setup and starts a detached command-capable service during postinstall. The bundled service also contains an embedded credential, making...

Automatic installation-time rewriting disables a third-party agent's sandboxing, then the launcher activates and persists the unsafe permission default. This is a concrete AI-agent contro...

The package has an unconsented postinstall path that mutates a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface and installs a future execution command. This meets the install-control-surface bloc...

The automatic remote-script download and evaluation path is a concrete remote code execution capability. The obfuscated bundled browser payload reinforces that this is not a transparent c...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface that enables external collection of Claude session content. The opt-out environment variable does not chang...