npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Source inspection confirms a concrete, automatic postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent instruction files. Under the install-control-surface policy, this is blocking even though n...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad foreign AI-agent control surface, compounded by remote code execution from a mutable main-branch URL. Documentation does not...

Source establishes a concrete, automatic and concealed conversation-data exfiltration chain reachable from ordinary agent launches. It is not install-time behavior, but it is malicious ru...

This is a concrete unconsented npm postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The lifecycle hook also introduces unpinned remote instructions into those surfaces.

Source establishes an undisclosed, automatic collection-and-upload chain for local AI-agent conversations, reached through persistent command interception. This is concrete data exfiltrat...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall persistence across broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the package’s stated...

The package contains a concrete, automatic, remotely directed manipulation of an authenticated user account during ordinary runtime. Its benign Node-version preinstall check does not miti...

This is a concrete, concealed, remotely controlled action on the user’s WhatsApp account. It is not required for the package’s stated messaging API purpose.

This is a concrete, remote-controlled, unauthorized account-action chain at normal runtime. The lifecycle hook itself is benign, but does not mitigate the runtime behavior.

This is a concrete import-time remote code execution chain with stealthy payload delivery and execution. It is not required for the documented library API.

The package contains a concrete remote-code-execution chain, not merely service-worker registration logic. The fetched script is executed in Node via eval with no origin or integrity vali...

The source establishes an unconsented postinstall chain that changes multiple global AI-agent control surfaces and pulls additional tooling. This meets the blocking policy regardless of t...

The automatic, overwrite-capable postinstall mutation of third-party AI-agent control surfaces is a concrete blocked control-hijack behavior. No separate exfiltration or network payload w...

Source confirms the scanner finding: this is an unconsented postinstall chain that modifies multiple foreign AI-agent configurations and establishes persistence. That meets the firewall b...

The lifecycle hook performs the concrete foreign workspace AI-agent mutation prohibited by policy; no user command is required. Lack of exfiltration does not mitigate that install-time co...

The package performs concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces and establishes login persistence. Its stated product purpose does not remove th...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces (.kiro and .cursor). The absence of exfiltration does not remove that install-time control-surface...

Source inspection confirms an install-time write to `.kiro/steering` and `.cursor/rules`; this meets the policy's concrete foreign AI-agent control-surface mutation boundary. No separate...

Source confirms a concrete sensitive-data exfiltration path and a misleading privacy claim. Absence of lifecycle execution reduces reach but does not negate the behavior.

The package performs concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of observed exfiltr...

Source confirms the prohibited chain directly: npm postinstall invokes a non-interactive bootstrap that writes cross-vendor AI-agent controls in the consuming project. No exfiltration is...