npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The lifecycle code establishes an unconsented, cross-project AI-agent control path at install time. This meets the firewall block condition even though no install-time exfiltration was ob...

Source inspection confirms an unguarded postinstall mutation of foreign/broad agent skill locations. The lifecycle condition contradicts the script's global-install-only claim.

Direct source inspection confirms automatic postinstall global agent configuration and hook injection. This meets the firewall block policy even though no exfiltration endpoint was found.

Source inspection confirms concrete, obfuscated third-party license/beacon and overlay injection into consumer build artifacts, unrelated to the declared SVG utility. No lifecycle hook is...

This is a concrete unverified remote payload chain activated by npm postinstall, not merely a normal packaged optional dependency. The fixed IP endpoint and disabled TLS validation make t...

The malicious behavior is directly reachable at install time and has no package-related purpose. It combines host/credential-context collection, metadata probing, and external exfiltration.

Direct source inspection confirms concrete install-time data collection and exfiltration. The benign main entrypoint does not mitigate the malicious lifecycle behavior.

This is concrete, automatic install-time data exfiltration unrelated to the package's advertised utility functions. The benign index entrypoint does not mitigate the malicious lifecycle p...

Direct source inspection confirms automatic remote transmission of sensitive account configuration to an unrelated logging endpoint. This is a concrete credential-exfiltration path, not m...

Source establishes a direct runtime path from configured IMAP passwords to a third-party logging endpoint. The lack of install hooks does not mitigate this concrete credential-exfiltratio...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The inspected lifecycle code also permits remote instructi...

This is a concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including destructive replacement of existing paths. It meets the blocking policy regardle...

The package performs concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple broad AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block policy even though no install-time exfiltration...

This is an unconsented install-time mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the firewall block policy despite no confirmed data exfiltration.

The automatic postinstall crosses multiple unrelated AI-host configuration domains and persists package-controlled agent behavior. This meets the install-control-surface block boundary ev...

This is a concrete unconsented install-time mutation of foreign global AI-agent configuration, not merely a user-invoked CLI feature. No separate credential-exfiltration chain was confirmed.

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces. The absence of lifecycle exfiltration does not neutralize the persistence and permission...

Direct source inspection confirms an import-time remote payload fetch followed by eval with no validation. This is a concrete remote-code-execution chain, not merely a static hint.

Source inspection confirms an import-time remote-payload loader with dynamic execution. This is a concrete arbitrary-code-execution chain, not merely a static hint.

Concrete import-time remote payload execution and persistence behavior is present in the package's default entrypoint. The benign helper functions and store do not mitigate this attack ch...

The import-time obfuscated installer creates a concrete remote-payload and persistence chain. Absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate execution when consumers import the defaul...