npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Direct source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook force-installs agent instructions outside the package directory. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutation o...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook creates a persistent global OpenCode prompt channel and overwrites command names. Scanner claims of encrypted temporary payload execution and...

Source inspection confirms the concrete install-time OpenCode control-surface mutation required for blocking. Scanner claims of encrypted payload execution were not corroborated, but are...

Direct source inspection confirms deliberate credential exfiltration on the exported runtime path. The lack of lifecycle scripts limits automatic execution but does not remove the concret...

Direct source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook performs forced user-level OpenCode command injection. This meets the firewall block policy regardless of the scanner's unrelated bund...

Source inspection confirms concrete postinstall mutation of host and user AI-agent configuration, exceeding a normal dependency install boundary. This meets the firewall policy for a publ...

This is unconsented install-time mutation of broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces, coupled to remote executable delivery and persistence. The skips and uninstall behavior do not re...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of a global AI-agent command surface, not merely package-local setup. The lack of observed install-time exfiltration does not remove...

The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall path that mutates a broad AI-agent control surface. Under the install-control-surface policy, this requires blocking regardless of the b...

The lifecycle hook performs broad AI-agent skill installation automatically rather than through an explicit user command. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutati...

Direct source inspection confirms the policy-defined blocking behavior, independent of scanner labels. The bundled payload appears product-aligned, but its unconsented broad postinstall d...

Source inspection confirms the scanner’s lifecycle concern: this is not inert code or an explicit user command. The automatic broad agent-host skill installation meets the firewall block...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad foreign AI-agent control surface. The benign-looking skill content does not remove that install-time control-surface risk.

Source confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent configuration via a remotely resolved npx installer. This meets the install-control-surface block boundary.

The source directly implements the policy's blocking condition: postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent configuration via a global all-agent installer. Scanner findings about fonts...

The behavior is explicit in shipped source and is activated automatically at install time. Product-aligned skill content does not remove the policy violation of broad unconsented postinst...

The package has a concrete postinstall chain that installs agent skills globally across detected hosts without an explicit user command. This meets the firewall block policy for foreign/b...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, user-level OpenCode command surface. This concrete lifecycle control-surface write meets the blocking policy even though...

The package performs the policy-defined blocking behavior directly at npm postinstall: broad AI-agent configuration mutation without an explicit user command.

The concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces meets the firewall block policy. Branding and visible error handling do not remove that install-time contr...

Source inspection confirms the policy-blocking install-time mutation of a broad, user-level OpenCode command surface. No separate encrypted payload execution or exfiltration was confirmed...