npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Direct source inspection confirms deliberate, hard-coded exfiltration of credentials supplied by the package consumer. The lack of install hooks does not mitigate the malicious runtime be...

Direct source inspection confirms raw Discord-token disclosure to a hard-coded developer webhook. Absence of install hooks does not mitigate the concrete runtime credential-exfiltration p...

Source inspection confirms concrete, automatic exfiltration of a user-supplied credential to a hard-coded developer endpoint. No lifecycle hook is needed because the malicious behavior is...

The package is an explicit staged remote-code loader, not a checkout or analytics implementation. Lack of install hooks limits automatic activation but does not remove the concrete RCE ca...

The code implements a remote, server-controlled payload loader with full Node process access. Lack of automatic import or install execution limits triggering but does not remove the concr...

Obfuscated network transmission of arbitrary caller input with no implemented validation is concrete malicious behavior. It is runtime-triggered rather than install-time, but warrants blo...

The concealed runtime install and execution are unrelated to SVG validation and constitute a concrete malicious execution chain. Lack of an npm lifecycle hook limits activation to explici...

Source directly confirms unconsented install-time collection and exfiltration of local system data. This is concrete malicious behavior, not merely a suspicious primitive.

Source establishes a concrete covert collection-to-remote-message path, not merely a risky primitive. The absence of install hooks does not mitigate runtime data exfiltration after normal...

The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation chain targeting broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces. The absence of install-time networking does not mitigate that pers...

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign global AI-agent control surfaces, including a persistent Codex lifecycle execution hook. The absence of install-time network...

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle installer performs broad foreign AI-agent configuration writes. This meets the blocking policy regardless of the absence of network exfiltration.

The lifecycle behavior itself meets the block boundary: postinstall mutates multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, rather than requiring an explicit setup command. No exfiltration wa...

This is a concrete remote-code-execution loader, not a normal resource fetcher. Lack of an install hook limits activation to runtime, but does not remove the malicious execution chain.

This is unrelated to the declared middleware behavior and executes without user invocation beyond importing the package. Obfuscation, host collection, outbound transmission, and command e...

The postinstall behavior directly meets the blocking policy for unconsented mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces. Opt-out flags do not make the default installation consens...

Direct source inspection confirms an unconsented preinstall data-harvesting and exfiltration chain. No legitimate package functionality is present.

This is concrete, default-enabled data exfiltration to a package-controlled external endpoint, not merely local dashboard functionality. The absence of an npm lifecycle hook reduces insta...

Source confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the firewall block boundary even though no exfiltration or fixed remote payload wa...

The source establishes the policy-defined blocking condition: automatic lifecycle mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent configuration surfaces. No separate exfiltration or remote execution...