npm detections from LPM Firewall.

Source inspection confirms the lifecycle hook performs the concrete chain; this is not merely a static heuristic. Its install-time OpenCode configuration write and unsigned remote runtime...

Source inspection confirms the scanner’s core finding: the package performs global AI-agent configuration and third-party skill installation during npm postinstall. That concrete behavior...

The package is transparent about its behavior, but the behavior is still an unconsented global-install lifecycle mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces. Under the firewall policy, th...

The source establishes a concrete, runtime-triggered data-exfiltration path through hard-coded third-party webhooks. Although no token value is sent to those webhooks, unconsented transmi...

Source establishes a concrete covert assessment-cheating and proctor-evasion workflow with persistence, not a benign DOM utility. The unused browser-cookie helper further raises risk, whi...

The inspected source confirms the scanner's central claim: a `postinstall` performs automatic global Claude skill and MCP registration. This meets the firewall policy for a block regardle...

The package’s postinstall hook silently writes packaged agent instructions into multiple third-party agent configuration locations. Under the firewall policy, this lifecycle-driven broad...

This is concrete cross-origin credential and session-data exfiltration to hardcoded external hosts, not merely ordinary store API traffic. No install-time mutation is needed for the runti...

The package contains an install-time, remotely directed persistence and data-exfiltration chain. The copied unrelated README does not describe or justify this behavior.

The package has no confirmed exfiltration chain, but its install hook automatically replaces a globally discovered Claude Code skill. Under the firewall policy, this concrete postinstall...

Direct source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall persistence chain into user-wide Claude control surfaces, not merely scanner similarity. This meets the block boundary for uncon...

Direct source inspection confirms a concrete install-time data-exfiltration chain. The package should be blocked.

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time mutation of foreign consumer AI-agent configuration surfaces, not merely scanner hints. This meets the blocking policy despite safeguards...

This is a concrete, unconsented `postinstall` mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The remote binary bootstrap increases impact, even thou...

The package contains import-time, obfuscated remote payload execution unrelated to CSS prefixing. Lack of an install hook does not mitigate arbitrary shell execution when the package is i...

Direct source inspection confirms a concealed, import-time remote-command execution chain. The lack of install hooks does not mitigate arbitrary command execution during ordinary package...

The package contains a concrete, automatically triggered remote execution chain with stealth and system-modification behavior unrelated to its stated WordPress functionality. Empty Telegr...

This is a concrete import-time remote command execution chain, not a package-aligned CSS-processing feature. Lack of an install hook does not mitigate execution when the package is import...

Direct inspection confirms concrete, automatic credential exfiltration in the package manifest. This is not package-aligned functionality and meets the blocking threshold.

The package's advertised transformer functionality is absent, while its automatic lifecycle hook retrieves and executes a remotely controlled payload. This is concrete install-time remote...

Direct inspection of the sole shipped file confirms concrete install-time credential harvesting and external exfiltration. This is malicious behavior, not a package-aligned feature.